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LORDS OF LASH, LOOM, AND LAW*: JUSTICE
STORY, SLAVERY, AND PRIGG V.
PENNSYLVANIA
Barbara Holden-Smitht

I met many runaway slaves. Some was trying to get north and
fight for [the] freeing of [their] people. Others was just] runnin'
'way 'cause [they] could. Many of [them] didn't had no idea where
[they] was goin', and told of havin' good marsters. But, one and
all, [they] had a good strong notion to see what it was like to own
1
your own body.
[Last night] about ten o'clock at night, five or six men went to
the house of a colored man by the name ofJohn Wilkinson, broke
open the door, knocked down the man and his wife, and beat
them severely, and seized their boy, aged fourteen years, and carried him off into Slavery. After the father of the boy had recovered himself, he raised the alarm, and with the aid of some of the
his neighbors, put out in pursuit of the kidnappers, and followed
them to the river; but they were too late. The villains crossed the
river, and passed into Virginia. I visited the afflicted family this
morning. When I entered the house, I found the mother seated
with her face buried in her hands, weeping for the loss of her
child. The mother was much bruised, and the floor was covered
in several places with blood. I had been in the house but a short
time, when the father returned from the chase of the kidnappers.
When he entered the house, and told the wife that their child was
lost forever, the mother wrung her hands and screamed out, "Oh,
my boy! oh, my boy! I want to see my child!" and raved as
* The title of this article is adapted from Charles Sumner's observation that the
interests of New England cotton manufacturers and Southern cotton producers were
intertwined. As Sumner put it, there existed a symbiotic relationship between "the lords

of the loom and the lords of the lash." 1 C.F. ADAMS, RICHARD HENRY DANA 127 (3d ed.
1891), quoted in Leonard W. Levy, Sim's Case: The FugitiveSlave Law in Boston in 1851, 35J.
NEGRO HisT. 39, 40 (1950).
t Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. For their valuable comments I
am grateful to Gregory Alexander, Paul Finkelman, Linda Hirshman, Pamela Johnson,
Sheri Lynn Johnson, R. Kent Newmyer, Russell K. Osgood, Steven Shiffrin, Gary Simson, Aviam Soifer, and to the participants in the session on slavery at the 1992 annual
meeting of the American Society for Legal History at Yale Law School where I presented
a previous version of this article.
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Statement of Edward Lycurgas, quoted in BULLWHIP

302 (James Mellon ed., 1988).
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though she was a maniac. I was compelled to turn aside and weep
2

I
INTRODUCTION: JUDGES, SCHOLARS, AND MORAL DILEMMAS

The primary characteristic shared by slaves in pre-Civil War
America was skin color: only Africans or the descendants of Africans
were presumed to be slaves. 3 As a result of this equation of black
skin with the potential for enslavement, free blacks in both the
North and the South lived under constant threat of being kidnapped
and sold into slavery. After the abolition of slavery in the North, the
free states became "one vast hunting ground,"' 4 as slave catchers
went into those states, not only to reclaim runaway slaves but also to
kidnap free blacks to sell into bondage in the South. Such kidnapping often involved forcibly abducting free persons or tricking them
into voluntarily leaving the free state with the slave catcher. 5
But a second form of kidnapping also occurred, one made possible by the existence of the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act. 6 By this statute, Congress purported to implement the third clause of Article IV,
7
Section 2, of the Constitution-the so-called Fugitive Slave Clause.
The 1793 Act mandated that, before removing an alleged runaway
from the state into which he or she had fled, a slave catcher must
obtain a certificate of removal from a federal judge or state judicial
official.8 However, the Act contained little else in the way of proce-

dural safeguards for alleged runaways, 9 making it quite easy for a
slave catcher to procure a removal certificate for any black person,
runaway or not.
2

Account of William Wells Brown (1844), reprinted in 1 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY

OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 246 (Herbert Aptheker ed., 1951).
3
KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM

SOUTH 193 (1956).
4 C.W.A. David, The Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 and its Antecedents, 9 J. NEGRO HIST.
18, 22 (1924).
5

THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL:

THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE

NORTH, 1780-1861, at 33-34 (1974).
6 "An Act respecting fugitives from justice, and persons escaping from service of
their masters." Act of February 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302 (1793) [hereinafter cited as Act of

1793].
7 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 provided that:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws

thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be

8

delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may
be due.
MORRIS, supra note 5, at 2 1.

9 See infra text accompanying notes 183-93 for a discussion of the provisions of the
1793 Fugitive Slave Act.
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In the 1820s, in an effort to eliminate both kidnapping by force
and trickery and that facilitated by the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act, some
free states-most notably Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts-enacted "personal liberty" statutes.10 These statutes imposed criminal liability on anyone who removed a black person from
the state without complying with a number of procedures not required by the 1793 federal statute. The primary purpose of these
state procedures was to protect free blacks from kidnapping,"1 but
they also had the effect of providing some measure of due process to
12
those who actually were fugitive slaves.
3
However, in 1842 the Supreme Court, in Priggv. Pennsylvania,1
struck down Pennsylvania's personal liberty law as unconstitutional.
The decision stripped the states of nearly all authority to regulate
the practices of slave catchers.1 4 Justice Joseph Story's opinion for
the Court was exceedingly proslavery in both its language and effect, and was harshly condemned by antislavery activists. 15
Justice Story's authorship of such a strongly proslavery opinion
has persistently perplexed historians and legal scholars.' 6 One reason for their consternation undoubtedly is Story's reputation as one
of the greatest jurists ever to serve on the Supreme Court. There is
no denying that his contributions to the development of American
law were legion. He was appointed to the Supreme Court at a
younger age (thirty-two) than anyone before or since,' 7 served on
the Court for thirty-four years, and wrote some of the Court's most
esteemed opinions. A professor at Harvard Law School for sixteen
years, he almost single-handedly resurrected the law school in the
1820s.18 He was also, the author of fourteen legal commentaries, an
editor of three others, and an anonymous or ghost writer of numerous periodical pieces, encyclopedia articles, and law reports.' 9 He
10 For a thorough examination of the history of the personal liberty laws see, MORRIS, supra note 5.
11
12

Id. at 23-41.
Id.

41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
See infra text accompanying notes 248-50.
15 For the reaction of antislavery forces to the Prgg decision see Paul Finkelman,
Prigg v. Pennsylvania andNorthern State Courts: Anti-Slavery Use of a Pro-Slavery Decision, 25
'3
14

CIVIL WAR HIST. 5, 16-19 (1979).
16 See, e.g., ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT, THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS: 1789-1888, at 245
(1985); CARL B. SWISHER, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, VOLUME V: THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-64, at 530-

31 (1974); Christopher L. M. Eisgruber, Comment, Justice Story, Slavery and the Natural
Law Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 273, 279 (1988).
17 Gerald T. Dunne, The American Blackstone, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 321, 322 (1963).
18 Id.
19 Id.
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gave a host of speeches, served as an unofficial consultant to Senators and Congressmen in the drafting of legislation, and even
drafted many bills himself.20 As one commentator summed up
Story's contributions: "No figure of Story's era [includingJohn Marshall] even roughly compares with him in terms of impact on the
'2 1
American legal system."
Historians and legal scholars have been troubled by Story's
Priggopinion not only because it seems inconsistent with his generally distinguished reputation but, even more so because it does not
22
square with his reputation as a judge morally opposed to slavery.
How was it, they have wondered, that this judge renowned for his
passionately antislavery stance could have rendered such a proslavery opinion? Many have offered explanations. According to R.
Kent Newmyer, for example, the Prigg opinion reflects Story's desire
to honor the bargain on slavery made between North and South. In
the eyes of Newmyer, the opinion was thus for Story a means to
preserve the Union. 23 Henry Steele Commager makes this argument as well. 24 David Currie, on the other hand, suggests that Story
believed that, by stripping the states of authority to implement the
Fugitive Slave Clause, the decision would make the owner's right of
recapture more difficult to enforce. 25
Id
CraigJoyce, Statesman of the Old Republic, 84 MICH. L. REV. 846, 848 (1986) (reviewing R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE
OLD REPUBLIC). One unrestrained historian said of Story:
[A]s a teacher and law lecturer without an equal, as a judge urbane and
benign, and as a man of spotless purity, he wrought §o long, so indefatigably, and so well that he did more, perhaps, than any other man who
ever sat upon the Supreme Bench to popularize the doctrines of that
great tribunal and impress their importance and grandeur upon the public mind.
HAMPTON L. CARSON, 1 THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 234 (photo. reprint 1991)
(1891).
22 See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Life of the Law: Values, Commitment, and
Craftsmanship, 100 HARV. L. REV. 795, 798 n.7 (1987) ("Story was a strong abolitionist
who struggled with his hatred of slavery and the Constitution's sanction of it."); Joyce,
supra note 21, at 857 ("Story's deep personal aversion to slavery, evidenced from his
earliest days on the bench, is beyond doubt."); Eisgruber, supra note 16, at 279 (Story
was "a profound opponent of slavery"). One scholar has gone so far as to say that
"[a]Imost single-handedly Story articulated a constitutional philosophy of moderate civil
rights for Negroes during his tenure on the Supreme Court." Morgan D. DowdJustice
Story and the Slavery Conflict, 52 MASS. L.Q. 239, 240 (1967).
20
21

23

R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE

377 (1985).
Henry S. Commager, The Nationalism ofJoseph Story, in THE BACON LECTURES ON
THE CoNsTrrtToN OF THE UNITED STATES 1940-1950, at 31, 44 (1953).
25 CURRIE, supra note 16, at 245 n.54, quoting Story's son's statement that Justice
OLD REPUBLIC

24

Story referred to the decision as a "triumph of freedom." See also Dowd, supra note 22,
at 251 ("What [Story's] critics failed to realize was that Story purposely wrote Prigg v.
Pennsylvania with the avowed purpose of disrupting the entire system of slaveholding.").
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Carl Swisher, however, attributes the Prigg opinion to Story's
sense ofjudicial duty. According to Swisher, Story felt compelled to
uphold the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act because he saw it as a law within
Congress' constitutional authority. Similarly, he felt obliged to
strike down Pennsylvania's personal liberty statute because it conflicted with the supreme federal law.2 6 In his 1975 book Justice Accused, Robert Cover offers a sophisticated variation of Swisher's
theme.2 7 According to Cover, Story was caught in a "moral-formal
dilemma" in which he had to choose between his conscience and his
duty to follow the law. He resolved this dilemma, Cover argues, by
28
convincing himself that the law gave him no choice.
SWISHER, supra note 16, at 541. See also I LEON FRIEDMAN ET AL., THEJUSTICES OF
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969, at 447 (1969) (contending that in his
slavery jurisprudence Story "attempted the impossible-to resolve disputed points
within a libertarian framework while giving effect to the basic constitutional design and
making the Court a composing rather than a disruptive element in the irrepressible con-

26

THE

flict."); 2

CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY

1821-

1855, at 359 (1922) (asserting that the abolitionists' condemnation of the Prigg opinion
"could not perturb" a judge such as Story who was merely doing his duty as he saw it);
and Finkelman, supra note 15, at 15 (suggesting that, although "[t]here is no doubt Story
opposed slavery," a likely explanation for Prigg is that Story "believed that the Constitution demanded federal protection for masters seeking their fugitive slaves").
27
COVER, supra note 16.
28 Cover's study was an attempt to understand the behavior of a number of other
nineteenth century judges, in addition to Story, who were reputed to be morally opposed to slavery, yet who upheld proslavery laws. Cover's theory was quite elaborate,
bringing to bear jurisprudential, historical, and even psychological notions like "cognitive dissonance" to explain the judges' dilemma and their resolution of it. His theory is
primarily set forth in Part III of his study. For a recent distillation of Cover's theory see,
AnthonyJ. Sebok, Judging the Fugitive Slave Acts, 100 YALE L.J. 1835, 1835-1839 (1991).
For reviews of Cover's book, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Justice Accused: Antislavery and the
JudicialProcess, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 350 (1976);James W. Ely,Jr.,JusticeAccused: Antislavery
and theJudicialProcess, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 265; Eugene D. Genovese, The PoliticalFoundations ofJustice, 85 YALE LJ. 582 (1976); Mark Tushnet,Justice Accused: Antislavery and the
JudicialProcess, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 168 (1976); Ronald Dworkin, The Law of the SlaveCatchers, LONDON TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Dec. 5, 1975, at 1437.
Justice Story himself is to some extent responsible for the scholarly enchantment
with the "morality versus duty" theory as a means to reconcile his proslavery position in
Prigg with his antislavery reputation. He laid the foundation for this view shortly after
the decision. Writing to a friend in November of 1842, he argued that he was compelled
by his duty as a judge to render decisions upholding the laws, even where those laws
upheld the institution of slavery. Story explained:
I shall never hesitate to do my duty as a Judge, under the Constitution
and laws of the United States, be the consequences what they may. That
Constitution I have sworn to support, and I cannot forget or repudiate
my solemn obligations at pleasure. You know full well that I have ever
been opposed to slavery. But I take my standard of duty as a Judge from
the Constitution.
2 THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 431 (William Wetmore Story, ed., 1851)
[hereinafter LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY]. Similarly, in 1843, he delivered a lec-

ture to his Harvard law School class in which he sought to justify his decision in Prigg by
arguing that:

19931
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I think all of the hand-wringing over the conflict between
Story's personal position on slavery and his proslavery decision is
misdirected. As I hope to demonstrate in Part II, this conflict was
much less dramatic than commentators have assumed. I argue that
Story's antislavery reputation is seriously overblown. Curiously,
though Story's reasoning in Prigg has been heavily criticized, and
although some scholars have questioned whether his antislavery
reputation is well-deserved, 29 none has undertaken an exploration
of Story's slave trade opinions so as to ascertain the reputation's
validity.
In Part III, I further suggest that the Prigg case illustrates that
Story cared far more about the protection of property rights and the
expansion of federal power than he did about the injustices being
done to black people by the fugitive slave law. Like many privileged
whites of his era, Story was so far removed from the plight of the
black victims of slavery and racism that he was unable to appreciate
the harmfulness and depravity of the practices he sanctioned in
Prigg.
II
STORY'S ANTISLAVERY REPUTATION

Story's reputation as a judge morally opposed to slavery rests
primarily on two types of evidence: his public statements opposing
the expansion of slavery into the new states of the West and his judicial pronouncements condemning the international slave trade. Relying on this evidence, historians and legal scholars have portrayed
Story as a jurist vigorously opposed to slavery who was willing to
use his judicial office to undermine the institution whenever possible. However, the accuracy of this portrait is more chimerical than
real. It ignores the political context in which Story made his remarks, and it fails to take into account a number of cases in which
There is a clause in the Constitution which gives to the slaveholders the
right of reclaiming a fugitive slave from the free States. This clause some
people wish to evade, or are willing wholly to disregard. If one part of
the country may disregard one part of the Constitution, another section
may refuse to obey that part which seems to bear hard upon its interests,
and thus the Union will become a "mere rope of sand"; and the Constitution, worse than a dead letter, an apple of discord in our midst, a fruitful
source of reproach, bitterness, and hatred, and in the end discord and
civil war.
As recorded in the journal of Rutherford B. Hayes while a student in Story's class, quoted
in CHARLES R. WILLIAMS, I THE LIFE OF RUTHERFORD B. HAYES, NINETEENTH PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1834-1860, at 36-37 (1914).
29 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 28, at 270-71 (suggesting that Story's "antislavery feelings were rather tepid"); and Tushnet, supra note 28, at 169 (criticizing Robert Cover for
failing to provide convincing evidence to support the antislavery reputation of the
judges he chose for his study).
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Story directly confronted issues involving the enforcement of statutes outlawing the slave trade.
In this Part, I first set forth the evidence in support of Story's
reputation as an antislavery judge and assess it in light of his concerns about the conflict between North and South. Next, I explore
the style and reasoning of some of the slave trade opinions that are
usually omitted from discussions of Story's antislavery reputation.
Finally, I examine the background of Prigg and Story's opinion in
that case.
A.

Opposition to Expansion of Slavery into the Territories

Justice Story twice joined the perennial national debate over the
expansion of slavery into the Western territories. The first instance
concerned the Missouri controversy of 1820. According to historian
Don Fehrenbacher, this controversy was sparked by a resurgence of
antislavery agitation in Congress in 1819. This renewed agitation
followed nearly fifteen years of congressional silence on the subject,
a silence which was probably the result of the nation's preoccupation with international affairs leading up to the War of 1812.30

As Fehrenbacher points out, the explanation for the 1819 resurgence of antislavery activity in Congress is complex. Undoubtedly, part of the explanation is that Northerners morally opposed to
slavery were growing impatient, because the institution, rather than
withering away, seemed to have become entrenched in the South by
1819.31 However, any explanation of the renewed antislavery activ-

ity in Congress must also include the conflict between North and
South for hegemony within the Union, and the attendant belief of
many Northern politicians that Southern interests were now dominant in the nation's political life.3 2 Some of these Northern politicians attributed Southern political successes to the so-called "threefifths" clause of the Constitution.3 3 This clause required that every
five slaves be counted as the equivalent of three free men in apportioning representation in the House of Representatives and in the
Electoral College.3 4 The clause had the potential for creating a
Southern majority in Congress. Moreover, some Northerners argued, the Southern representational advantage had been responsible both for the defeat of John Adams by Thomas Jefferson in the
30

See DON

E.

FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED ScoTr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERI-

CAN LAW AND POLITICS 100 (1978).
31
See, e.g., DONALD L. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLI-

Tics, 1765-1820, at 407 (1971).
32
For expressions of this view, see id. at 405; and FEHRENBACHER, supra note 30, at

100.
33
34

ROBINSON, supra note 31, at 405.
Id. See also FEHRENBACHER, supra note 30, at 100-02.
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1800 presidential election, and for the 1812 election of James
Madison (whom many Northerners blamed for the continuation of
the War of 1812, a war they opposed). 35
Indeed, there may have been good reason for Northern concern about the Southern advantage in national politics. In 1819
Southern representation in Congress was on the rise, with Mississippi's 1817 admission as a slave-holding state, followed in 1819 by
Alabama, another slave state. Further, slavery threatened to become entrenched in the Arkansas Territory (which then consisted of
the present states of Arkansas and Oklahoma); slavery already had a
presence there, with slaves comprising about eleven per cent of the
population.36 In addition, although Florida was still a Spanish possession in 1819, it seemed likely to be the next territory acquired by
the United States, and its location and culture indicated that it too
would be a slaveholding state.3 7 Finally, because slavery already
existed in that part of the Missouri territory proposed as the new
state of Missouri,38 it was obvious that without a prohibition of slavery as a precondition to its admission as a state, Missouri would join
the ranks of the slavery forces in Congress.
Justice Story proved a vigorous opponent of the admission of
Missouri as a slaveholding state. At a Salem town meeting held on
December 10, 1819, a9 he argued that any extension of slavery into
Missouri was against "the spirit of the Constitution, the principles of
our free government, the tenor of the Declaration of Independence,
and the dictates of humanity and sound policy." 40 At that meeting
he also introduced a resolution, adopted and sent to Congress,
which declared it to be "the duty of the people and Government of
the United States... to prevent the extension of so great a political
and moral evil as slavery." 41 Moreover, there is evidence that Story
35
36

ROBINSON, supra note 31, at

405.

Id. at 413.
37 FEHRENBACHER, supra note 30, at 100-01.
38 Id. at 101.
39
Story's son has asserted that the Missouri controversy was so important to his
father that it was the only instance duringJustice Story's judicial life in which the Justice
publicly engaged in the discussion of a political question. 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OFJOSEPH
STORY, supra note 28, at 360. Justice Story himself wrote in 1825 that, since ascending to
the Supreme Court, he had "carefully abstained" from "mingling in political engagements" because of a desire that his "administration ofjustice should not be supposed by
the public to be connected with political views or attachments." Id. at 363. Despite
these assertions, it is clear thatJustice Story often involved himself in the political questions of his day, actively lobbied Congress, and frequently advised members of Congress, particularly Daniel Webster, in the drafting of federal legislation. See GERALD T.
DUNNE, JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT

(1970);

note 23.
40 See DUNNE, supra note 39, at 195.
41 1 LIFE AND LErERs Or JOSEPH STORY, supra note 28, at 360.

NEwMYER,

supra
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personally lobbied members of Congress in opposition to the pro42
posed Missouri Compromise.
During the national controversy over the annexation of Texas,
Justice Story again spoke out on the question of the territorial expansion of slavery. Texas was a slaveholding republic when it applied for annexation by the United States in 1837, after having won
its independence from Mexico in 1836. 4 3 The antislavery opposition to Texas was intense, andJustice Story supplied the anti-expansionist forces with the constitutional arguments against
annexation. 44 In an 1837 letter to his friend Joseph Tuckerman,
Story argued that the Constitution did not provide for the admission
of a foreign state, such as Texas, into the Union. Thus, Story concluded, Texas could not be admitted into the Union anymore than
could Great Britain. 4 5 Due to the strength of the anti-expansionist
forces, the annexation effort was dropped until the 1840s. However, by that time the issue had become, as Kent Newmyer says, "an
obsession" with Story. 4 6 He continued to argue that admission of a
foreign state like Texas was "grossly unconstitutional," 4 7 and "such
an extravagance" that the Framers of the Constitution "never
dreamed" it would ever occur, and so did not expressly provide
against it.48
Whether or not Story's belief in the immorality of slavery informed his objection to its expansion, his opposition, like that of
some of the other anti-expansionists, was also grounded in political
considerations. 4 9 In opposing the Missouri Compromise, he indicated more than once that for him the question of the expansion of
slavery was rooted in the conflict between New England and the
South for hegemony over the national government. For him this
42

See DUNNE, supra note 39, at 197 (quoting a South Carolina Senator who said that

a judge "had descended from his high station" in order "with no little zeal" to lobby
Congress on the Missouri Compromise. Dunne surmises that this judge was Joseph
Story).
43

44
45

supra note 30, at 124.
See SWISHER, supra note 16, at 560.
Swisher, supra note 10, at 560 (citing letter to Joseph Tuckerman from Joseph
FEHRENBACHER,

Story, July 25, 1837, in Fulmer Mood & Granville Hicks, Letters to Dr. Channing on Slavery
and the Annexation of Texas, 5 NEw ENGLAND Q. 593-94 (1932).
46 NEWMYER, supra note 23, at 351.
47

Id.

48 2 LIFE AND LE=rERS OF JOSEPH STORY, supra note 28, at 514.
49 It would, perhaps, be a mistake to try to separate the political and personal motives for opposing slavery that drove an abolitionist such as John Quincy Adams, who

devoted years of his life to the cause of abolishing slavery. For him, the personal and the
political were probably one. (For more on Adams see SWIsHER, supra note 16, at 19196.) However, as Newmyer points out, Story was no abolitionist. NEWMYER, supra note
23, at 166. Rather, he was a politician who, in my view, used antislavery arguments to
advance a political agenda that had far more to do with cementing the federal Union
than with freeing African-American people.
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was a contest of nationalism against confederation, a struggle for
union over dis-union. For example, writing to Professor Edward
Everett in 1820, Story complained that the South had gotten its way
on the Missouri question by using the tactic of "divide and conquer"
against New England. He warned that the various political factions
of New England must put their differences behind them and present
a united front against the South:
The spirit of anti-federalism has made but a partial progress
among [New Englanders]. But it exists deep and strong, both in
its roots and in its branches, at the South and West, and I verily
believe that if the East does not send forth its talents to sustain the
Constitution, and its legitimate powers in Congress, the Constitution will be frittered away, until it becomes the mere ghost of the
confederation. 5 0
Likewise, in opposing the annexation of Texas, Story wrote that
he believed its admission could "lead to the dissolution of the
Union," because it would "forever give the South a most mischievous, if not a ruinous preponderance in the Union. ' 5 1 Furthermore, Story lamented, "the non-slaveholding States seem to be
utterly unaware of, or indifferent to the dangers." 52 With the battle
to keep Texas out of the Union all but over, Story wrote to his wife:
What could be more disgraceful than the rejoicings in Boston on
the vote for Texas in the House of Representatives? It is said that
Nero fiddled while Rome was on fire, and Massachusetts men now
in like manner rejoice when their own State is to be reduced to
perpetual bondage to the slave-holding States. All this is the work
53
of office-holders and office-seekers, and corrupt demagogues.
Thus, Story's private correspondence suggests that his motives
in opposing the territorial expansion of slavery were primarily political. His "obsession" with the Texas question, his anger at having
lost the battle to keep Texas out of the Union, and his view of the
Missouri Compromise as a bitter defeat for New England, all point
to less concern with the immorality of slavery than with the ongoing
intersectional contest between North and South for dominance in
the Union.
At least one scholar has suggested that Story's support for the
preservation of the Union stemmed from his belief that the Union
54
represented the best hope for the eventual abolition of slavery.
50
51

52
53
54

(1990)

1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH

2

STORY,
LIFE AND LETITERS OF JOSEPH STORY,

supra note 28, at 367.
supra note 28, at 481.

Id.
Id. at 512-13.
See Mark V. Tushnet, Translationas Argument, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 105, 117-18
(reviewingJAMEs

BOYD
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However, there is no evidence to sustain'this view. 55 A more plausible explanation for Story's pro-Union stance was his belief that the
Union represented the greatest prospect for the development of
commerce and industry, which in turn would lead to the fulfillment
56
of America's potential to be a great nation.
B.

The International Traffic In Kidnapped Africans

To support their view of Story as an antislavery jurist, some
scholars rely more heavily on Story's statements and decisions in
slave trade cases than they rely on his opposition to the territorial
expansion of slavery. After briefly sketching the history of the federal legislative effort to outlaw American involvement in the international slave trade, I will examine the evidence usually advanced to
support Story's antislavery reputation, as well as his other opinions
in this area.
1. Historical Background
The attempt by antislavery forces to outlaw American involvement in the trade in kidnapped Africans has a long and complicated
history that involves intense intersectional strife, difficult questions
of international law and foreign relations, and, until the Civil War,
little show of success at ending the traffic. Only a brief outline of
that history is necessary here, however, to appreciate the context of
57
Justice Story's slave trade decisions.
The only provision in the Constitution that speaks directly to
the issue of the importation of slaves is the first clause of Article I,
Section 9. Although this provision prohibited Congress from outlawing the importation of slaves until 1808, it did allow for federal
imposition of a tax, not to exceed ten dollars, on each newly imported slave. 5 8 Almost immediately after George Washington's inLEGAL CRMCISM). Tushnet speculates that perhaps Story "believed that the survival of the Nation provided the best prospect for the elimination of slavery." Id.
55 See id (where Tushet offers no evidence to support his speculations). In contrast
to Tushnet's view, Newmyer, who has written the most comprehensive biography of
Story, states that Story believed in the "gradual" emancipation of slaves and that slavery
would end because it would not be re-supplied by the African slave trade and would not
be allowed to expand into new states. NEWMYER, supra note 23, at 351.
56 See the discussion of Story's nationalism in Part III of this Article.
57 For a concise treatment of this history, see ROBINSON, supra note 31, at 295-346.
AND

See also W.E.B. DuBois, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE TO THE UNITED
STATES 1638-1870, at 94-150 (1896) for a more detailed chronicle.
58 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 provided that:
The Migration or Importation of Such Persons as any of the States now
existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax
or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars
for each Person.
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auguration, antislavery forces in Congress sought to take advantage
of this federal taxing power as a means of discouraging "this irrational and inhuman traffic." 59 However, because Southern Congressmen vigorously opposed such a tax and because many
Northern Congressmen morally opposed to trafficking in human beings thought it would be odious for the federal government to obtain revenue from the slave trade, Congress never passed any
60
legislation imposing the tax.
Despite the Constitution's twenty-year prohibition on any outright ban of the trade, arguments that the federal government had
the power to regulate American involvement in the foreign slave
trade met with greater, though still quite limited, legislative success.
In 1794, Congress passed the first national law to restrict the international slave trade. The act's title--"an act to prohibit [the carrying on of] the slave trade from the United States to any foreign place
or country"-succinctly states its limited goal: to outlaw the export
of slaves from the United States to other nations. 6 1 Congress
amended the act in 1800 to impose the penalty of forfeiture of any
American citizen's interest in a ship engaged in transporting slaves
from one foreign country to another. 6 2 A further amendment in
1803 banned the importation of slaves into any state that had out63
lawed such importation.
After 1803, antislavery forces made various attempts to enact
legislation designed to limit American involvement in the African
slave trade, but until 1807 none were successful.r In that year Congress, anticipating the end of the constitutional prohibition, passed
a statute outlawing the importation .ofslaves into the United States
afterJanuary 1, 1808.65 The 1807 Act provided that violators would
be fined in amounts ranging from $800 for knowingly buying ille59
ROBINSON, supra note 31, at 299 (quoting Josiah Parker, Congressman from
Virginia).
60 See generally id.
at 299-312.
61

Id. at 312.

62 DuBois, supra note 57, at 84.
63 Id.
64 For a discussion of these efforts, see id. at 86-93; ROBINSON, supra note 31, at
318-24.
65
Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426 (1807). W.E.B. DuBois attributes the
passage of this prohibition of the slave trade at the "earliest constitutional moment" not
only to the work of anti-slavery forces in the United States, but also to the Haitian
revolution, in which African slaves rose up to kill their white masters, striking fear
throughout the slave-holding southern United States; the acquisition of the Louisiana
territory in 1803, which made possible the extension of cotton and sugar cultivation by
the southern planters and hence the greater expansion of slavery; and to the eighteenth
century anti-slavery struggle in England which culminated in 1807 with the prohibition
of the slave trade by the British. DuBois, supra note 57, at 94-95. See also JOHN HOPE
FRANKLIN, FROM SLAvERY To FREEDOM 79, 106-08 (4th ed. 1974).
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gally imported Africans to $20,000 for equipping a slave ship. 66 In
addition, the ship used to commit the crime, as well as any illegally
imported Africans, would be forfeited. 6 7 The "disposition" of these
forfeited human beings was left to the states. 68 Responsibility for
federal enforcement of the Act fell first to the Secretary of the
Treasury, then to the Secretary of the Navy, and at one time even to
69
the Department of State.
In spite of this new federal law, participation by Americans in
the slave trade continued after 1808, resulting in calls by President
Madison, among others, for better means of suppressing the trade
than those provided by the 1807 Act. 70 As a result of this agitation,
Congress passed a series of supplementary statutes between 1818
and 1820.71 These statutes prohibited American citizens from hiring themselves out to foreign ships engaging in the trade; 72 empowered the President to appoint an agent to reside in Africa for the
purpose of establishing a colony on the coast to which Africans
smuggled into the United States could be "deported"; 73 authorized
armed ships belonging to the United States to intercept vessels suspected of containing Americans engaging in the slave trade;74 and
increased the penalties by providing for imprisonment and by defining participation in the trade as piracy, punishable by death. 75 Yet,
because of the insatiable American appetite for slave labor, the
enormous profits to be made from the trade itself, the lax enforcement of the laws by the national government, and the various sub66
67

DuBois, supra note 57, at 104.
Id.

68

Id.

Id. at 111.
Historians generally agree that the shifting nature of the federal responsibility
for enforcement and the inadequate state laws for "disposing of" the illegally imported
Africans, combined with the reluctance of informers (especially in the South where the
violations most often occurred) to turn in violators, undermined the Act's effectiveness.
See, e.g., DuBois, supra note 57, at 110-11 (President Madison informed Congress that "it
appears that American citizens are instrumental in carrying on a traffic in enslaved Africans, equally in violation of the laws of humanity, and in defiance of those of their own
country."); FRANKLIN, supra note 65, at 110 ("New England shipmasters, Middle Atlantic
merchants, and Southern planters all disregarded the federal and state legislation when
they found it expedient to do so."); ROBINSON, supra note 31, at 338 ("Evasion [of the
Act of 1807] was made possible by the connivance of Deep Southerners, the smuggling
skills of Northerners and Europeans, and the primitiveness of national governmental
machinery.").
71 DuBois, supra note 57, at 118-123.
72 Act of Mar. 13, 1819, 3 Stat. 532 (1819).
73 Id.
74 Act of May 15, 1820, 3 Stat. 600 (1820).
75 3-4 G. EDWARD WHITE, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE
69
70

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE,

1815-1835, at 691 (1988). A thorough review of the legislative history of these supplemental statutes is given in DuBoIs, supra note 57, at 118-23.
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terfuges by which Americans circumvented those laws, the traffic in
76
kidnapped Africans persisted.
2.

Basis of Story's Antislavery Reputation

The efforts of Congress to curb American involvement in the
international slave trade would appear to provide fertile ground for
those seeking evidence that Story's opposition to slavery was more
than mere sermonizing, that in fact he translated his stated moral
convictions into the actual use of his judicial office in the struggle
against slavery in America. For example, R. Kent Newmyer asserts
that in cases involving slavery, Story showed that he was willing
to enlarge the area of freedom where the law allowed judicial discretion. The international slave trade was one such area. [His]
passionate condemnation of the trade in his circuit charges...
was in fact reflected in his decisions... Story's strong antislavery
feelings could be seen in his disposition of matters of evidence
and proof, questions that allowed him judicial discretion and that
77
abounded in slave-trade litigation.
James McClellan, noting in particular Story's decisions in slave trade
cases, contends that "Story's antipathy for slavery was reflected
throughout his judgeship." 78 Likewise, Robert Cover points to de-

cisions involving the African slave trade as testimony to Story's antislavery stance, contending that in one such case Story offered the
"strongest possible condemnation of the slave trade."' 79

Despite the force of these statements, scholars rely chiefly upon
only two pieces of evidence to support their view-Story's 1819
Grand Jury Charge and his opinion in a circuit court case, LaJeune
Eugenie.80
76 The easiest method of subterfuge was to switch flags on the slaving vessel and
procure the corresponding foreign papers, usually of Spain or Portugal, as Spain did not
prohibit the trade until 1820 and Portugal not until 1830. ROBINSON, supra note 31, at
342. Robinson argues that the weakness of the American navy, which he called "a miserable floating monument to the conviction of the Jeffersonians that navies were both
cause and effect of the twin evils of aristocracy and imperialism," was also a significant
impediment to the effective enforcement of the slave trade laws. Id at 341.
77
NEWMYER, supra note 23, at 347.
78

JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 297 (1971).

See COVER, supra note 16, at 101-02 (discussing United States v. LaJeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551)).
80 None of Story's biographers, with the exception of R. Kent Newmyer, even mentions any other slave trade decisions. Even Newmyer merely asserts that other cases
exist without analyzing them. For Newmyer's discussion of the evidence to support
Story's antislavery reputation, see NEWMYER supra note 23, at 345-53, 365-69. Robert
Cover points to one other decision, United States v. Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518
(1841), but recognizes the limited nature of that victory for kidnapped Africans. COVER,
supra note 16, at 116.
79
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Story delivered the 1819 Grand Jury Charge while fulfilling his
circuit court duty to charge New England grandjuries.8 1 In order to
"enlist [thejurors'] sympathies" in the suppression of the "inhuman
traffic," Story described in graphic detail the horrors of the international slave trade so that the jurors might know "the vast extent of
misery and cruelty occasioned by its ravages."'8 2 The following passage, in which he describes the conditions on board a slave ship during the voyage from Africa, typifies the frankness with which Story
expounded upon the evils of the trade:
As the slaves, whether well or ill, always lie upon bare planks, the
motion of the ship rubs the flesh from the prominent parts of
their body and leaves their bones almost bare. The pestilential
breath of so many, in so confined a state, renders them also very
sickly, and the vicissitudes of heat and cold generate a flux; when
this is the case (which happens frequently,) the whole place becomes covered with blood and mucus like a slaughter house, and
as the slaves are fettered and wedged close together, the utmost
disorder arises from endeavors to relieve themselves in the necessities of nature; and the disorder is still further increased by the
healthy being not unfrequently [sic] chained to the diseased, the
dying, and the dead!8 3
Nor did Story confine his outrage to the condemnation of the
slave trade alone, which, after all, had been outlawed as piracy
under federal statutes.8 4 He also railed against the institution of
American slavery itself, arguing that "[t]he existence of slavery
under any shape is so repugnant to the natural rights of man and the
dictates of justice, that it seems difficult to find for it any adequate
justification." '8 5 After reminding the jurors that the constitutions
both of the several states and of the United States declare "that all
86
men are born free and equal, and have certain unalienable rights,"
including the right to freedom, Story asked:
May not the miserable African ask, 'Am I not a man and a
brother?' We boast of our noble struggle against the encroachments of tyranny, but do we forget that it assumed the mildest
form in which authority ever assailed the rights of its subjects; and
81

According to his son, Story delivered this charge to the grand juries in Boston,

Massachusetts, and Providence, Rhode Island in 1819. 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH
STORY, supra note 28, at 336. Story gave this same charge again in 1820, this time to the
grand jury for the federal circuit court in the newly-admitted state of Maine. MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OFJOSEPH STORY 122 (William W. Story ed., 1852).
82
1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, supra note 28, at 341-42.
83 Id. at 345.
84
85
86

G. EDWARD WHrrIE, supra note 75, at 691.
1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, supra note 28, at 336.
Id. at 340.
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yet that there are men among us who think it no
wrong to con87
demn the shivering negro to perpetual slavery?
Perhaps, as Newmyer suggests, Story meant by this language to
educate New Englanders on the evils not only of the slave trade but
also of the institution of slavery. 88 However, just as there are indications that Story's extra-judicial lobbying activities in opposition to
territorial expansion were at least in part motivated by his desire
that the North not "forever give the South a most mischievous, if
not a ruinous preponderance in the Union,"8 9 so too there is evidence to suggest that his fiery grand jury charge, though framed in
humanitarian terms, was significantly motivated by his political concerns. Story twice delivered the charge while the national debate on
the Missouri Compromise was raging, and his own words suggest a
political connection. Writing to his friend Jeremiah Mason in November of 1819, Story said, "We are deeply engaged in the Missouri
question. I have fought against the slave trade in Rhode Island...
My charge was well received there." 90 Further, although it is unclear whether Story ever delivered the charge during interregnums
in the national debate over the territorial expansion of slavery, it is
clear that he gave a similar charge in 1838-just after the controversy over the annexation of Texas arose. 9 1
Three years after delivery of the 1819 charge, Story repeated its
passionate tone in LaJeune Eugenie. As previously noted, 9 2 his opinion in this case is the piece of evidence most often cited to illustrate
Story's willingness to oppose slavery from the bench whenever he
could do so without violating his duty to follow the law. 93 The Euge87

Id. at 340-41.

88
89
90
91

NEWMYER, supra note 23, at 166.

2 LIFE AND
Id. at 366.

LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, supra note

28, at 481.

NEWMYER, supra note 23, at 345. The 1819 Grand Jury Charge was not the first
time Story made antislavery pronouncements from the bench. He first did so four years
earlier in a circuit court opinion, Fales v. Mayberry, 8 F. Cas. 970 (C.C.D. R.I. 1815) (No.
4,622), a case that inexplicably has been ignored by those who applaud Story's record in
slave trade cases. In Fales, Story railed against the slave trade, calling it "a most odious
and horrible traffic" which was "contrary to the plainest principles of natural justice and
humanity" and so, "abstract[ly] speaking .... cannot have a legal existence." Id at 971.
This case could be seen as early evidence of Story's willingness to use his judicial position to undermine slavery. On the other hand, it might also have been part of Story's
effort to enhance "his status among the elite" of New England, NEWMYER, supra note 23,
at 167, and "to prove his dedication and his value to the conservative cause." Id. at 163.
As Newmyer points out, the conservatives of New England opposed slavery and the
slave trade, and in the early years of Story's judicial career he was anxious to convince
conservatives of his loyalty to their principles. Id. The conservatives distrusted Story
because of his earlier "radicalism" and his enforcement of national commercial regulations that the conservatives opposed.
92 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
93 See, e.g., COVER, supra note 16, at 101; NEWMYER, supra note 23, at 347-50.
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nie case involved the capture of the schooner Eugenie by the Alligator,
an American naval cruiser. Although the Eugenie was flying the
French flag at the time of its capture off the coast of Africa and had
papers on board showing the vessel to be the property of French
subjects, the captain of the Alligator suspected fraud. He believed
that the ship was actually an American slaver. Thus, under authority
of the 1807 Slave Trade Act, he and his crew seized the vessel and
took it to Boston, where they filed claims for libel in the district
court.
The libel petition alleged alternative grounds for condemnation
and forfeiture of the Eugenie: either the Eugenie was an American
vessel engaged in the slave trade in violation of United States law, or
it was a foreign ship captured as a prize because of its involvement
in trade "contrary to the law of nations." 94 The French consul,
however, filed a claim on behalf of the alleged French owners of the
ship, protesting the seizure and the judicial proceedings. The consul argued that the Eugenie was a French vessel, owned by French
subjects, and therefore subject only to the jurisdiction of a French
court. 95

Addressing the jurisdictional issue first, Story held that, even
assuming the Eugenie was a French vessel owned by French citizens,
an American court would still have jurisdiction if, at the time of its
seizure, the vessel was engaged in the slave trade in violation of the
law of nations. 96 After finding that the vessel had indeed been engaged in the slave trade, 9 7 Story turned to the question of whether
that trade offended the law of nations. In language echoing the ardor of his 1819 Grand Jury Charge, Story maintained that the slave
trade "begins in corruption, and plunder, and kidnapping," destroying "all the ties of parent, and children, [and forcing] the brave
to untimely death in defence of their humble homes." 98 Moreover,
Story maintained that "[a]ll the wars, that have desolated Africa for
the last three centuries, have had their origin in the slave trade. The
blood of thousands of her miserable children has stained her shores,
or quenched the dying embers of her desolated towns, to glut the
appetite of slave dealers." 99 This was a traffic, Story said, "beginning in lawless wars, and rapine, and kidnapping, and ending in disease, and death, and slavery." 10 0
94
96

La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Gas. at 834.
Id. at 835.
Id. at 845.

97

Id. at

98

Id. at 845.

95

99
100

840.

Id.

Id. at 846.
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Nonetheless, because his court sat in a nation in which slavery
was lawful, Story had to admit that he was in no position to say that
the existence of slavery itself was a violation of the law of nations.
The slave trade, however, did not enjoy the protection of American
law, and Story therefore felt free to say that this trade "stirs up the
worst passions of the human soul"''1 and is "repugnant to the great
principles of Christian duty, the dictates of natural religion, the obligations of good faith and morality, and the eternal maxims of social
justice."' 1 2 It was not enough, Story maintained, to say that war, or
slavery, or plunder was lawful, for those arguments did not "advance one jot ...the proposition, that a traffic, that involves them

all, that is unnecessary, unjust, and inhuman, is countenanced by the
eternal law of nature, on which rests the law of nations."' 10 3 Since
the slave trade combined such a multitude of evils, Story reasoned,
it was inconsistent "with any system of law, that purports to rest on
the authority of reason," and thus contrary to the law of nations.04
As a result, he concluded, an American court was bound to "deal
with it as an offense carrying with it the penalty of confiscation."' 10 5
Story went on to hold that, because the trade was also illegal under
the law of France and because French law provided for the penalty
of forfeiture, his court not only had jurisdiction, but also was not
required to surrender the ship to the French claimants who had violated French law.' 0 6
According to Story, the validity of the claim for libel made by
the captain of the Alligator depended upon whether the ship was
American or French. Curiously, Story never directly decided that
question. Earlier in the opinion he suggested that the French claimants had failed to show that the ship had been divested of all American ownership, and he seemed convinced that the French papers
fraudulently concealed the ship's true American status.' 0 7 Nevertheless, Story implicitly found the ship to be French, not American,
for he held that the claims of the Alligator's captain and crew had to
be dismissed because "a share in the forfeiture accrues to them
only, when the case is reached by our laws."' 108 The case could, of
course, be reached by American law only if the vessel's owner or its
crew were American citizens. Accordingly, Story held that neither
101
102

Id. at 845.
Id at 846.

1o

Id

104
105
106
107
108

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

847.
850.
840-41.
850.
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the claims of the American captors nor those of the French owners
1 09
could be maintained.
Despite the zealousness of Story's antislavery rhetoric and his
novel finding that the slave trade was contrary to the law of nations,
the Eugenie decision is not as bold as some have argued. First, Story
disposed of the case by turning the ship over to the "king of France,
to be dealt with according to [the king's] own sense of duty and
right." 1 10 As G. Edward White has pointed out, this disposition
hardly seems consistent with Story's finding that forfeiture was the
penalty for engaging in the illegal trade."' Second, in merely denouncing the traffic, Story was not ahead of his contemporaries. By
1822, when Story decided the case, the international slave trade was
widely condemned, as shown by the fact that the United States,
Great Britain, and most of the European trading nations, had outlawed it.112 Third, decisions about the slave trade, unlike those addressing the institution of American slavery itself, involved neither
the competition between federal and state authority nor the protection of property rights. As will be discussed later, these two matters
were of great importance to Storya-much more important than his
moral objection to slavery. 1 13
3.

Story's Other Slave Trade Cases

In contrast to the expansiveness of the Eugenie opinion, Story's
other slave trade opinions were narrow in their reasoning and devoid of any mention of the immorality of the trade. They were also
marked by the sedulous application of the same legal rules he applied in non-slave trade cases. The point in saying this is not to
damn Story for failing to fashion unique legal rules to govern slave
trade cases, nor is it to praise him for a consistency that some might
regard as evidence of his "objectivity." Rather, the point is that in
slave trade cases, Story applied the same principles that he applied
in other kinds of litigation, even though nothing compelled the application of those principles and, most importantly, he did so with109
11o
111

Id. at 850-51.
Id. at 851.

WHITE, supra note 75, at 696.
COVER, supra note 16, at 102.
113 .Indeed, the Eugenie opinion shows that, far from being a formalist who merely
applied the law as he saw it, Story could be expansive when it suited his purposes to do
so. Moreover, the argument that the Eugenie is evidence of Story's antislavery position is
further undermined by the fact that just three years after the decision, Story concurred
with ChiefJustice Marshall's opinion in The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825),
that the slave trade did not violate the law of nations. For a suggestion that Story's
concurrence in the Antelope can be explained by a change in the political climate during
the three years after the Eugenie case, see COVER supra note 16, at 104.
112
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out regard to whether the result was favorable or unfavorable to
4
slave traders.'
As Kent Newmyer has pointed out, many of the rules and principles that Story used to decide issues arising in slave trade litigation
were derivative of his experiences in the prize cases that grew out of
the War of 1812.115 For example, one of the most important legal
principles Story used in slave trade cases was to look behind the
ship's papers to ascertain the true ownership of a vessel whenever
fraud was suspected. Story applied that principle in his most famous slave trade decision, LaJeune Eugenie, as well as in the less wellknown slave trade case, United States v. Amistad.11 6 Although some
have characterized this willingness to go behind the ship's papers as
a bold move on Story's part, he was simply applying a principle that
17
he used in numerous prize cases.'
Story's consistency in employing in slave trade litigation the
same rules and principles he employed in other types of cases is also
apparent in his opinions involving issues of statutory construction.
Story adhered to the general rule that statutes were to be construed
so as to give effect to the legislature's intent. 18 According to Story,
this intent was to be garnered from the words used in the statute,
for when "words are plain and dear, and the sense distinct and perfect arising on them, there is generally no necessity to have recourse
to other means of interpretation."' 1 9 But, like the Marshall Court
generally 20 and modem courts today, Story often resorted to "ex114 There were only ten cases which directly confronted Story with issues involving
enforcement of the laws against the slave trade, and so his opportunities to address
these issues were relatively few. One must be careful in making an assessment based on
so sparse a record. However, the foundation of Story's antislavery reputation is itself
thin, based, as it is, primarily upon his Eugenie opinion and, to a lesser extent, the Grand
Jury Charge and his opposition to the territorial expansion of slavery.
115
NEWMYER, supra note 23, at 350.
116 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518, 594-95 (1891). For a discussion of this case see infra text
accompanying notes 150-61.
117 See, e.g., The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1 (1821); The Dos Hermanos,
15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 76 (1817); The Ann Green, 1 F. Cas. 958 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No.
414); The Bothnea, 3 F. Cas. 962 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 1,686); The Diana, 7 F. Cas.
634 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 3,876); The Liverpool Packet, 15 F. Gas. 641 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1813) (No. 8,406).
118 JOSEPH STORY: COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrITUION 135 (1987). ("The first
and fundamental rule in the interpretation of all instruments is, to construe them according to the sense of the terms, and the intention of the parties.")
119 Id. at 136.
120
See John Choon Yoo, Note, Marshall'sPlan: The Early Supreme Court and Statutoy
Interpretation, 101 YALE LJ. 1607 (1992), espousing the view that Chief Marshall brought
order and consistency to statutory interpretation by resolving the conflict among American jurists as to whether the English common law canons of interpretation should be
followed to interpret statutes, or whether the courts should use the more American approach, favored by Republicans like Thomas Jefferson, of confiningjudges to the legislature's intent as expressed by the words actually used in the statute. This Note, which
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trinsic" aids in order to divine legislative intent whenever he found
statutory terms to be ambiguous. Generally, when Story resorted to
extrinsic aids, he employed the common law canons of construction
as guides for determining legislative intent. 2 1 Story used this approach to statutory construction in slave trade cases as well, with
results favorable to slave traders on some occasions and unfavorable
to their interests on others.
For example, Story followed this method in The Alexander,' 22 a
case involving forfeiture of a vessel that allegedly had been engaged
in a voyage to transport slaves from Africa, but which had not yet
taken any slaves on board at the time of seizure. The issue in the
case was how to construe the first section of the Slave Trade Act of
1800. This section made it unlawful for any citizen of the United
States "[to] have any right or property in any vessel employed or
made use of in the transportation or carrying of slaves from one
foreign country to another."' 23 The owner of the vessel argued
that, in order for the forfeiture penalty to apply, the statute required
proof that slaves had actually been transported; the mere intention
to transport slaves, even though the vessel was on a voyage for that
purpose, was insufficient.
In rejecting the owner's argument, Story held that congressional intent controlled. Turning to one of the common law canons
of construction in order to ascertain Congress's intent, he held that
it was necessary to look to the language used in other sections of the
Act of 1800.124 After examining other parts of the statute, he argued that the words of the first section of the Act "clearly indicate a
legislative intent to reach the case of vessels, whose business, employment, or traffic was slave voyages."' 12 5 That being so, he held,
mere intention to employ the vessel in the unlawful trade was sufficlaims to be the only systematic look at the principles used by the Marshall Court to
construe federal legislation, argues that the Marshall Court's guiding principle was to
construe statutes according to their "plain meaning" and to resort to the common law
principles of construction only where a statute was ambiguous. But, the Note also argues, the Court often employed the canons in order to expand the powers of both the
federal judiciary and the federal government. Id. at 1615-16. However true this may or
may not have been of the Marshall Court in general, it is certainly consistent with the
view that expansion of federal power wherever possible was one of the guiding principles of Story's jurisprudence.
121
See id. at 1624.
1 F. Cas. 362 (C.C.D. Mass. 1823) (No. 165).
122
Id. at 362.
123
124
Story had employed this same principle of statutory construction some eleven
years earlier in a smuggling case holding that "in the construction of all statutes, it is a
general rule, that the courts are to expound them according to the intention of the framers," and this intent is "to be gathered, not merely from an examination of a single
section, but from comparing together different sections of the same statute." The Harmony, 11 F. Cas. 556 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 6,081).
125 The Alexander, 1 F. Cas. at 363.
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cient to affix the penalty of forfeiture, even though no slaves had
26
actually been transported.'
Nonetheless, just as Story was willing to apply the canons of
statutory construction where doing so aided the government's ability to prosecute in slave trade cases, he was also willing to employ
those principles where doing so inhibited the government's ability
to prosecute such cases. Interestingly, two cases demonstrating the
latter point involved indictments in which the government sought
the death penalty.
The first of these, United States v. Gooding,' 2 7 involved an indictment against one of the "most conspicuous and avaricious"' 28 slave
traders in the city of Baltimore, itself a conspicuous and principal
port for fitting out ships for the slave trade.' 29 At the trial in the
Maryland circuit court, the government produced evidence to prove
that Gooding had caused two ships to be outfitted in the port of
Baltimore, that the ships had sailed to Africa, and that one of them
had brought back 290 kidnapped Africans for sale in Cuba. Upon
the request of Gooding's counsel (one of whom was future Chief
Justice Roger Taney), the circuit court suspended the trial and certified a number of questions to the Supreme Court.' 3 0
Gooding had been indicted under sections 2 and 3 of the 1818
Slave Trade Act. Section 2 of the Act provided that no American
citizen could "build, fit, equip, load, or otherwise prepare, any ship
or vessel, in any port or place within the jurisdiction of the United
States, nor cause any such ship or vessel to sail from any port or
place whatsoever within the jurisdiction of the same, for the purpose
of procuring any negroes . . .to be transported ... as slaves."' 3 1
Section 3 provided penal sanctions for the "building, fitting out,
equipping, loading, or otherwise preparing .... with intent to em-

ploy such ship or vessel in such trade or business.

.

"...132

Among

the questions certified to the Supreme Court was whether the indictment was technically defective so as to require dismissal. Gooding's
lawyers argued that the counts of the indictment charging a violation of sections 2 and 3 ought to have contained an allegation that
the vessel was built, fitted out, etc., within the jurisdiction of the
United States.

127

Id.
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460 (1827).

128

GUSTAVUS MYERS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

126

(1912).
129
130
131
132

Id.
Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 467.
Id at 476.
Id. at 476-77 (emphasis omitted).
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In answering this question for the Supreme Court, Story contended that the issue turned on the meaning of "such ship or vessel" as used in the relevant sections of the Act. This phrase, he said,
must refer to a ship or vessel built, fitted out, etc. within the jurisdiction of the United States, or else the word "such" would have no
meaning and would be mere surplusage. Employing his general
rule for construing statutes, Story held that the Court's duty was to
"give effect to every word in every enactment, if it can be done without violating the obvious intention of the legislature."'' 3 3 But in deciding just what the "intention of the legislature" was on this issue,
Story resorted to one of the common law canons. Penal statutes, he
said, must be "construed strictly," with "no intendment or extension beyond the import of the words used."' 3 4 Ostensibly applying
this rule of strict construction, he then used a surprising hypothetical, one wholly irrelevant to the facts of the case at hand, to hold
that the indictment was fatally defective for its failure to allege specifically that the vessel had been fitted out within the jurisdiction of
the United States. Story explained:
There is no certainty that the legislature meant to prohibit the
sailing of any vessel on a slave voyage, which had not been built,
fitted out, & c. within the jurisdiction of the United States. If a
foreign vessel, designed for the slave trade, and fully fitted out for
that purpose, were, by accident or design, to anchor in our ports,
it would not be reasonable to suppose that the legislature could
have intended the sailing of such a vessel from our ports to be an
35
offence within the purview of our laws.'
As a result of these defects in the indictment, the government eventually dismissed it, and Gooding escaped further prosecution.
Story's opinion was roundly condemned by antislavery activists. 1 36 These activists had sought for many years to obtain a conviction and sentence of death of a slave trader under the piracy laws to
serve as a strong deterrent to others engaged in the trade, and Gooding was one of the few slave trade prosecutions in which the governId

at 477.
Id.
135
Id. On a second issue involving the sufficiency of the indictment, Story's reasoning was even more narrow. With regard to that issue, Story had to decide whether the
indictment was deficient because it failed to allege the offense in the same words as
those used in the statute. The statute prohibited the outfitting of a ship in an American
port if done "with intent to employ [the vessel] in the slave trade." Id. at 478. The
indictment, however, charged that Gooding outfitted the ship "with intent that [the vessel] should be employed" in the slave trade. Id. (emphasis added) Using reasoning that
bordered on the metaphysical, Story held that there was a clear distinction between the
two. The statute applied to the intent of the person doing the act, he said, while the
words used in the indictment applied "to the employment of the vessel," whether it was
the person charged in the indictment or a stranger who did the employing. Id
136 LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS 34 (1966).
133
134
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ment had sought the death penalty. Moreover, Gooding was one of
the most notorious of the slave traffickers, and the government appeared to have overwhelming proof of his guilt. Gooding's escape
from prosecution was thus a significant blow to the efforts of the
antislavery forces. Indeed, it was not until 1862 that any American
13 7
was put to death for violating the antislave trade laws.
In United States v. Battiste,13 8 an 1835 circuit court case, Story
again used common law canons to construe a provision of the slave
trade laws strictly, with the result that the accused escaped the death
penalty. Battiste was a crew member on the American, a ship hired to
transport slaves and their owners from one port to another in the
Portuguese colonies along the African coast. He was indicted under
the provisions of the 1820 piracy act that imposed the death penalty
on "any person whatever" who was a member of the crew of "any
ship or vessel, owned in whole or in part, or navigated for, or in
behalf of any citizen . . . of the United States" who received on
board the ship "any negro or mulatto, not held to service or labor
by the laws of either of the states or territories, with intent to make
39
such negro or mulatto a slave."'
The statute's terms seemed to apply directly to Battiste's conduct. As the evidence at his trial showed, he was a crew member on
board an American-owned ship that had landed on a foreign shore
and there received on board a number of slaves. The ship had made
four stops along the African coast, transporting slaves from one port
to another. At each stop, the enslaved Africans "were brought to
the shore hand-cuffed, and chained together," and attended by
guards. 140 Each time "Battiste assisted in removing the fetters" of
14 1
the Africans and in "receiving them on board the brig."'
In charging the jury, however, Story applied the "strict construction" common law canon with such a vengeance that the jury
had no choice but to find that the intent requirement of the statute
had not been satisfied. Focusing upon the words "to make the negro a slave," Story interpreted the statute as requiring the government to show that Battiste "had some title or interest in or power
over the negroes in question, so as to be able to impress upon them
by his own act the character of slaves ...."142 This interpretation is
hardly an obvious one, for it ignores the statute's application to
"any person" who engaged in the prohibited conduct. Story's inter137
138

DuBois, supra note 57, at 191.
24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545).

139

Id. at 1044.

140

Id. at 1042.

141
142

Id. at 1042-43.
Id. at 1045.
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pretation exempted all lower-echelon participants of a slave trading
enterprise from the statute's terms because mere crew members
would have no "tide or interest" in the slaves per se. Story acknowledged that the statute was intended to prohibit any and all Americans from participating in the traffic in African slaves, however that
trade was carried on, and also to suppress the trade along the coast
of Africa. Apparently, in Story's view, Battiste had nothing to do
with making the Africans slaves or with "perpetuating their state of
slavery."143
Congress could not have intended, Story argued, that the death
penalty be imposed on one who, like Battiste, transported slaves for
hire from one port to another in the same jurisdiction. In Story's
view, "the mere transportation of a negro slave, as a passenger for
hire" was not as morally reprehensible as engaging in the capture of
human beings and their subsequent sale as slaves; indeed, mere
transportation involved "not the slightest moral turpitude," even
though such transportation "may... facilitate the operations of the
slave dealer." 14 4 Apparently, Battiste's conduct was, to Story, morally no different than that of a crew member of a ship engaged in the
transportation of ordinary merchandise who had helped load the
merchandise on and off the ship. Moreover, the "inhuman traffic"
of his 1819 Grand Jury Charge1 45 became "mere transportation" in
Battiste. Of course, this change in language does not prove that
Story was more concerned about saving the defendant from the
punishment of death than he was about vigorous enforcement of the
antislave trade laws. However, the change does lead one to question whether the passionate terms Story used in the Grand Jury
Charge were mere rhetorical devices rather than reflections of
deeply held convictions.
To further buttress his conclusion that Congress had not intended to make "mere transportation" of a slave a capital offense,
Story employed two other common law canons: in pari materia and
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.14 6 He pointed out that, in the other
slave trade acts, Congress had used language that expressly prohibited the transportation of slaves from the coast of Africa and from
Id. at 1044.
Id. at 1045-46.
See supra text accompanying notes 81-87.
146 The in pari materia canon allows the judge to look to other statutes dealing with
the same subject matter in determining legislative intent. See 2B JABEz G. SUTHERLAND,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51-03, at 468 (NormanJ. Singer ed., 5th ed.
1992). Under the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon, which roughly translated means
"a statement of one is an exclusion of another," the judge must infer that, where the
143
144
145

statute expressly includes certain acts or persons within its terms, the legislature did not
intend that the statute reach any act or persons not included in the statutory language.
2AJABEZ G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23, at 216.
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one foreign country to another. Therefore, Story concluded, if
Congress had intended the 1820 statute to increase the penalty and
to make "mere transportation" a capital offense, one would expect
to find explicit language to that effect in the 1820 statute. Such an
omission, he reasoned, "furnishes a presumption, that the legislature had some other and different offence in their view."' 147 Not sur148
prisingly, given this charge, the jury acquitted Battiste.
The decisions in Gooding and Battiste are difficult to reconcile
with the prevailing view of Story as ajudge willing to use his discretion whenever possible to rule against slave traders. After all, flexibility is the hallmark of canons of statutory construction. Having
their genesis in equity, they equip the judge with discretion to
render "strict" or "liberal" interpretations of a statute depending
on the judge's view of how the statute ought to be applied to the
particular case at hand. Yet in deciding Gooding and Battiste, two of
the rare instances in which the federal government actually prosecuted slave traders, let alone sought the death penalty, Story employed that discretion to construe statutes "strictly" and allow the
slave traders to escape the death penalty. Perhaps the results in
these two cases are partly explained by the rule that, in capital cases,
statutes ought to be strictly construed against the government. 14 9
This rule, however, is merely another common law canon of statutory construction, not a "meta-canon" to be used to guide applications of the common law canons discussed above.
These cases are not somehow aberrant, rare instances in which
a staunchly antislavery jurist felt compelled by duty to adhere to the
"letter of the law," even though he found doing so morally repugnant. Rather, Story did not go out of his way, not even in the famous Eugenie case, to render a decision adverse to proslavery forces.
Typically, Story was quite consistent in applying certain legal rules
and principles across a spectrum of cases, even when it was the enforcement of the slave trade laws that was at stake. As a result, he
sometimes decided issues in slave trade cases against those clearly
implicated in the slave trade and sometimes he decided issues in
their favor.
Moreover, the tone and reasoning of the other slave trade opinions are far different from the passionate rhetoric and expansive
reasoning of the Eugenie opinion. More typical is Story's 1841 opin147
148

Battiste, 24 F. Gas. at 1046.
Id.

149 Story did not expressly employ this rule in either Gooding or Battiste. However, he
indicated in United States v. Smith that different rules ought to apply in capital cases than

in criminal cases in which the death penalty is not sought: "If the present were a capital
case, it would be our duty to adhere to the very letter of established doctrines in favorem
vitae." United States v. Smith, 27 F. Gas. 1167, 1169 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (No. 16,338).
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ion for the Court in United States v. The Amistad. 5 0° The issue in this
case was the proper disposition of a group of approximately fifty
Africans recently kidnapped from their homelands and taken to
Cuba as slaves. This abduction violated Spanish law enacted in accordance with an 1817 treaty between Spain and Great Britain that
abolished the slave trade throughout the dominions of Spain.
Under this law, an African imported into any of the Spanish colonies
contrary to the treaty would be declared free in the first port at
5
which the African arrived.' '
During a voyage in which the fifty kidnapped Africans were being transported from one Cuban port to another, the Africans on
board the Amistad mutinied, killed the ship's captain, and took control of the vessel. 152 The "mutineers" directed the two Spaniards
who had purchased them to sail the vessel back to Africa. Unfortunately, the Spaniards were able to trick the Africans and sail the vessel to a port in the United States. The Spaniards were then rescued
by an American ship's captain, who eventually took the Amistad to
New London, Connecticut and filed a claim for libel of the vessel
153
and its cargo in the District Court of Connecticut.
The United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut filed
a conflicting libel claim, asserting that the Spanish minister had officially presented a claim upon the United States for return of the
vessel, cargo, and kidnapped Africans as property of Spanish subjects. 5 4 The United States argued that a 1795 treaty between the
United States and Spain required that the Africans be returned to
the Spanish claimants. The ninth article of this treaty provided that
"all ships and merchandise" rescued on the high seas "out of the
hands of any pirates or robbers" and brought into a Spanish or
United States port were to be restored to the owners "as soon as
due and sufficient proof shall be made concerning the property
thereof."' 155 The district court found the treaty inapplicable and the
Africans to be free men and women. After a pro forma affirmance
by the circuit court, the United States appealed to the Supreme
Court.
150 The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518 (1841). This is the only slave trade case,
other than the Eugenie case, discussed in any depth by scholars who explore Story's antislavery reputation. See, e.g., NEWMYER, supra note 23, at 368-69, and COVER supra note
16, at 109-116 discussing the Amistad case.
151 The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 563.
152 JOHN R. SPEARS, THE AMERICAN SLAVE TRADE 184 (1900).
153
1 HENRY WILSON, THE HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER IN
AMERICA 457 (1872).
154 The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 588.
155 Id. at 592.
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In an opinion for the Court, Story affirmed the district court.
Following the reasoning of the lower court, he held that, under the
1817 treaty between Britain and Spain and the Spanish statute of
the same year, the Africans were never slaves under Spanish law.
Therefore, Story said, they were not "merchandise" as that term
was used in the 1795 treaty between the United States and Spain.
Moreover, since the Africans were free, they could not be "pirates
or robbers" under the treaty. Thus, the libel claim filed by the
Spanish government had to be denied, and the Africans were enti15 6
tled to their freedom.
Story's decision was a victory for the abolitionists who represented the Africans in the litigation, 15 7 to say nothing of the Africans
themselves. The victory, however, was a limited one because Story's
holding rested on a close reading of the terms of the treaty and,
more importantly, because it relied on the fact that the slave trade
was prohibited by Spain. Indeed, at one point in the opinion, Story
said that, if the Africans had been lawfully enslaved under the law of
Spain and "capable of being lawfully bought and sold," then there
was "no reason why they may not justly be deemed within the intent
of the treaty, to be included under the denomination of merchandise. .... -158 These are rather cold, not to mention gratuitous,
words from a judge who supposedly had a burning opposition to
slavery. Further, there is not one word in the opinion about the
immorality of either slavery or the slave trade.
Commentators have speculated about the reasons for Story's
narrow holding in The Amistad and for his failure to address the
question of the morality of slavery in that case. Newmyer argues
that perhaps Story was acting as "spokesman for an increasingly divided Court, in a period of explosive sensibilities ..
,"159 According to Swisher, it may have been because he was speaking for a
Court that included slaveholders.1 6 0 Cover suggests that Story's
strong stance against the slave trade "cooled a bit" in later years as a
result of the influence of "his idol," ChiefJustice John Marshall. 16 1
Id. at 593-96.
The Africans were represented byJohn Quincy Adams, who at seventy-four years
old came out of virtual retirement to do so, Roger Baldwin and Lewis Tappan, among
other antislavery activists. COVER, supra note 16, at 110-11.
158
The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 593.
159 NEWM YR, supra note 23, at 368. Newmyer's argument may have validity given
the increasing heat with which Americans were debating the slavery question by 1841.
160
SWISHER, supra note 16, at 194. With the exception of Justice Baldwin, Story's
opinion for the Court was joined by all six of the other Justices who sat for the arguments. It is unlikely that the southerners Taney, Wayne, and Daniels would have joined
an opinion which rested on expansive notions about the unlawfulness of the slave trade.
161
COVER, supra note 16, at 239. The problem with Cover's explanation is that
Story's work in cases involving the slave trade cannot be neatly divided into early-Story
156

157
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In my view, Story's narrow decision in The Amistad and his failure to mention the immorality of the slave trade is merely consistent
with the style and substance of his opinions in most of the other
slave trade cases. There is simply nothing remarkable here. For example, in The Plattsburgh,1 62 a slave trade case decided sixteen years
before The Amistad, Story exhibited the same restraint in rendering
an opinion without articulating any expansive general principles of
law, and without commenting on the immorality of slavery or the
slave trade.
The case involved the forfeiture of the schooner Plattsburgh,
which had been seized by an American warship off the coast of Africa in 1820 and taken to the port of New York where a libel was
filed under the Slave Trade Acts of 1794 and 1800. The vessel,
which was originally registered in Baltimore as an American ship,
had set sail from the port of Baltimore ostensibly for Cuba. The
claimants of the ship contended that, once in Cuba, the vessel was
sold to a Spanish national in a bona fide purchase, and that it was
only at the new Spanish owner's behest that the ship embarked on
the voyage to Africa for the purpose of engaging in the slave trade.
The government contended that the purchase was a fraud and that
the purpose of the voyage from the time it left Baltimore was to sail
163
to Africa.
It was undisputed that the vessel had been engaged in the slave
trade at the time of its seizure. There were only two issues. The
first issue was whether the purchase by the Spaniard was genuine.
The second issue was whether the voyage had been originally undertaken in the United States or instead had been undertaken by the
Spanish national after he purchased the vessel in Cuba in a transaction totally unconnected to the voyage from Baltimore to Cuba.
The Spanish claimant argued that no matter how immoral or inhumane the slave trade might be, the Court was required to decide
these issues upon "principles of law, and not merely upon principles
of justice or morality."

164

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision condemning the vessel. In his opinion for the Court, Story addressed
and late-Story periods. Some of Story's earlier decisions, like United States v. Smith, 27
F. Gas. at 1167 and United States v. La Coste, 26 F. Cas. 826 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (No.
15,548), as well as such mid-career decisions as United States v. Gooding, showed the same
lack of passion as The Amistad. Moreover, the 1819 Grand Jury Charge was also given in
1838, after Story had been on the bench for twenty-seven years, and Marshall was dead.
Nevertheless, I do agree with Cover that whatever passion Story may once have felt
against the slave trade certainly seemed spent by 1841.
162 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 133 (1825).
163
164

Id. at 134-39.
Id. at 142.
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only the narrow factual issue and said nothing about the evils of the
slave trade. In response to the claimant's argument, Story said that
"the Court [will] have nothing to do with the conscience of the
Spanish claimant, if he has established a bona fide, legal ownership." 16 5 But ownership was the very question at issue and Story
concluded that the proof was insufficient to establish that the sale
had been bonafide. The proof, moreover, showed that "the unlawful
166
enterprise had its origin at Baltimore."
In two circuit court cases decided in 1820 involving the sufficiency of indictments brought for violations of the slave trade laws,
Story similarly stuck closely to technical issues and said nothing
about the immorality of the slave trade. In the first of these cases,
United States v. La Coste, 16 7 the defendant argued for the reversal of
his conviction and the dismissal of the indictment because the indictment failed to allege with specificity some of the material allegations against him. Citing such hoary English authorities on criminal
pleading as Hawkins 168 and Hale, 16 9 Story rejected the defendant's
argument. 70 The mere "wanting in technical accuracy and precision" in the wording of an indictment was not fatally defective,
Story held, so long as the indictment's averments followed the lan17 1
guage of the statute under which the defendant was charged.
So too, in the second case, United States v. Smith, 17 2 Story rejected the defendant's contention that the indictment was defective
because it failed to state the precise time when the offense had been
committed. Story asserted that he was "no friend to over curious
and nice exceptions in mere matters of form, either in civil or criminal proceedings." Such pleading technicalities were, he said, "a
blemish and inconvenience in the law and the administration
thereof," resulting too often in the escape of the guilty from punishment.' 73 Story allowed that "the defendant is entitled to the benefit
174
of these niceties wherever the law is settled in favour of them."'
Yet, because there was no settled rule requiring that an indictment
set forth the specific date on which the offense occurred, Story held
that the indictment's failure to allege the specific date was not a fatal
error. 175 In this case, just as in La Coste, there is no mention of the
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

Id.
Id. at 146.
26 F. Cas. 826 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (No. 15,548).
WILuAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1716).

174

Id

175

Id. at 1169.

SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1680).
United States v. La Coste, 26 F. Cas. at 830.

Id
Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1167.
Id. at 1168.
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evils of the slave trade. Indeed, nothing in either opinion indicates
that the fact that the cases involved indictments against slave traders
had anything to do with Story's analysis. Thus, despite the rhetoric
of a few sporadic cases, Story's antislavery reputation has been exaggerated. As demonstrated in the next section, his opinion in Prigg
confirms my argument.
C.

The Prigg Decision
1. Background of the Case

Northern attempts to regulate the capture and return of fugitive
slaves apparently date back to 1629.176 The first inter-jurisdictional
regulation addressing the problem came in 1643.177 The Fugitive
Slave Act of 1793 was the first national legislation to regulate the
interstate reclamation of putative runaways. Like Prigg, the 1793 Act
grew out of a controversy between Pennsylvania and a neighboring
slaveholding state, and involved the apprehension and return of
slavehunters accused of having removed an alleged slave from
Pennsylvania in violation of Pennsylvania law. 178 In May of 1788
three white citizens of Virginia, acting for hire, went into Pennsylvania and captured a black man named John Davis. They took
him back into Virginia on the alleged ground that Davis was a slave
who had run away from his Virginia master. Unfortunately for the
three slave catchers, Pennsylvania had passed a statute in March of
1788 making it a crime to take a black person "by force or violence"
from the state of Pennsylvania with the "design and intention of
176 The earliest regulation is probably that found among the freedoms and exemptions granted by the West India Company in 1629 to the settlers of the colonies of New
Netherlands. The Company promised that its authorities would "do all in their power to
return to their masters any slaves or colonists fleeing from service." MARION GLEASON
McDOUGALL, FUGITIVE SLAVES 2, 89 (1971).
177 The first such agreement was made in 1643 by the New England Confederation
of Plymouth, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Haven. The Articles of Confederation of these States contained a provision for the return of a "servant" who had run away
from the master "[u]pon the Cert[i]ficate of one Ma[g]istrate in theJurisdi[cti]on out of
which the said servant fled, or upon other due proof[], the said servant shall be
deli[v]ered either to his Master or any other that pursues and brings such Certificate or
proofi]." Id. at 7.
178 Extended treatments of the history of the controversy leading to adoption of the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 are set forth in MoRRIs, supra note 5, at 19-22; Paul
Finkelman, The KidnappingofJohn Davis and the Adoption of the FugitiveSlave Law of 1793, 50
J. S. HIST.397 (1990); William R. Leslie, A Study in the Origins of Interstate Rendition: The
Big Beaver Creek Murders, 57 AM. HiST. REV. 63 (1951). Leslie and Finkelman differ in
their accounts, with Leslie arguing that, in addition to the conflict over the kidnappers of
John Davis, an earlier controversy between Pennsylvania and Virginia involving the rendition of fugitives accused of having murdered several members of the Delaware Indian
Nation also prompted the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act. Finkelman disagrees, arguing that the John Davis affair was the sole trigger.
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selling and disposing" of that person as a slave.1 7 9 The 1788 statute
was Pennsylvania's first legislative attempt to protect the state's free
black citizens from being kidnapped and sold south into slavery.180
The problem of the kidnapping of free blacks was especially acute in
Pennsylvania because three of the states bordering it (Virginia,
Maryland, and Delaware) were slave states.
After the three slave catchers were indicted for kidnappingJohn
Davis, Pennsylvania's governor requested that they be returned to
Pennsylvania for trial. However, despite the fugitive-from-justice
provision of Article IV, Section 2 of the Federal Constitution, 1 8 ' the
governor of Maryland refused the extradition request. The two
states appealed to President George Washington to settle the conflict, and he in turn referred the whole matter to Congress.'8 2 After
a lengthy legislative process, Congress enacted the Fugitive Slave
Act of 1793.183 The Act provided procedures for both the interstate
return of fugitives from justice and the interstate capture and return
84
of fugitive slaves.'
The 1793 Act contained two sections regulating reclamation of
runaway slaves. Section 3 of the Act authorized the putative owner
of an alleged fugitive slave, or the owner's agent, to seize the person
and to take him or her before any federal judge "residing or being
within the state" or before any magistrate of the county, city or incorporated town where the fugitive had been seized.' 8 5 Upon
"proof to the satisfaction" of the judge or magistrate that the person seized was really a fugitive and was owned by the claimant, the
Leslie, supra note 178, at 67 n.18.
180 Pennsylvania was the first state to abolish slavery when in 1780 it enacted "An
Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery." A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATrER
OF COLOR 299 (1978). At the same time, the statute conferred on owners of runaways a
general right of recapture. See MORRIS, supra note 5, at 26 (citing Pennsylvania decisions
to that effect).
181
"A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall
flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State
having Jurisdiction of the Crime." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
182 Allen Johnson, The Constitutionalityof the Fugitive Slave Acts, 31 YALE LJ. 161, 163
179

(1921).
183 For an account of the legislative history of the Act of 1793, see Finkelman, supra

note 178, at 410-18.
184 Act of February 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302 (1793) [hereinafter Act of 1793]. The legislative history of the Act of 1793 does not show why Congress included provisions addressing both clauses in the same statute. Perhaps it did so because both clauses appear
together in the Constitution and had been adopted together at the Convention. Or
perhaps it did so because the dispute between Pennsylvania and Virginia involved criminal fugitives accused of kidnapping a black man whom the fugitives contended was a
runaway slave.
185

Id at 303. The Act of 1793, like the clause itself, nowhere uses the term slave,

preferring instead the euphemism used in the Constitution, "Person held to Service or
Labor." U.S. CoNsT. art. IV § 2, cl. 3.
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judge or magistrate was to issue a certificate authorizing the claimant to remove the fugitive to the state from which he or she had
allegedly fled.1 86 Proof could be oral in the form of the sworn testimony of the claimant or the claimant's agent.'8 7 It could also be an
"affidavit taken before and certified by a magistrate" of the state
from which the seized person had allegedly escaped from bondage.""' Section 4 of the Act authorized the imposition of criminal
penalties on any person who obstructed the capture of a fugitive, or
8 9
who rescued, aided, or concealed the fugitive.'
The terms of the Act did not prohibit the judicial official from
either conducting a hearing if the fugitive lodged a competing claim
of freedom or taking the testimony of the captured person on such a
claim. There was no explicit provision in the Act, however, encouraging the official to do either. Nor did the Act contain any other
procedural protections for an alleged runaway who disputed the validity of the claim.' 90 Thus, the Act appeared to provide no more
than a summary ministerial proceeding-one not designed to
render a final adjudication on the status of the person seized.' 9 '
The 1793 Act proved to be an inadequate solution to the conflict over the return of fugitive slaves, 19 2 and it did nothing to deal
with the problem of the kidnapping of free blacks. Indeed, it may
have exacerbated the latter problem.' 93 Pennsylvania's subsequent
experience, discussed below, illustrates the predicament.
After the 1793 Act became the law of the land, the practice in
Pennsylvania was for a slave catcher to seize the alleged fugitive (or
186

Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 302, 303-05.

187
188
189

Id.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 305.

MORRIS, supra note 5, at 21.
191 Proslavery forces and antislavery forces in Congress disagreed about whether
adjudication of the claim to freedom had to take place in the state of seizure. The proslavery forces argued that reclamation procedures in the free states were summary ministerial proceedings to be followed by a full adjudication of the putative owner's claim to
the captured person once the person was returned to the state from which he or she had
fled. On the other hand, the antislavery forces contended that reclamation procedures
were, for all practical purposes, final, as the Southern states provided no further adjudication of the validity of a claim once the captured person was removed to a Southern
state. See MORRIS, supra note 5, at 31-41; MCDOUGALL, supra note 176, at 20-23; Joseph
Nogee, The Prigg Case and Fugitive Slavery, 1842-1850, 39 J. NEGRO HIsT. 185, 189-91
(1954).
Because of the ineffectiveness of the 1793 Act, Southern slaveholders continually
192
agitated in Congress for a new fugitive slave law, but their efforts proved unsuccessful
until 1850. William R. Leslie, The Pennsylvania Fugitive Slave Act of 1826, reprinted in ARTI190

CLES ON AMERICAN SLAVERY 211, 213 (Paul Finkelman, ed., 1989).
193 See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 30, at 41 (noting that the lack of any procedural

protections for the alleged fugitive in the 1793 Act made it "an invitation to
kidnapping").
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have that person arrested by local authorities) and then immediately
take him or her to the nearest judge or justice of the peace, if such
an official could be found. If the claimant was able, by oral testimony or affidavit, to satisfy the judge or justice of the peace that the
seized person was the claimant's slave, then the official, in accordance with the 1793 Act, granted the certificate authorizing the claimant to remove the person from the state. The certificate served as
conclusive proof against any claim to freedom by the captured
person. 194
However, it was frequently difficult for slave catchers to find an
official to adjudicate their claims. There were only two United
States district judges for all of Pennsylvania, and the Supreme Court
Justice riding circuit in Pennsylvania was there only part of the
time. 105 As a result, slave catchers often resorted to seizures by
force or subterfuge.' 9 6 At the same time, the Act's limited requirements made it relatively easy for a slave hunter to kidnap a free
black person, obtain the necessary removal certificate, and carry the
person south to be illegally sold into slavery. Some of these false
claims were successful because of the use of trickery and fraudulent
testimony.' 9 7 Others succeeded, however, because some of the justices of the peace who adjudicated claims colluded with the slave
catchers to send free blacks into slavery.' 98
During this period, kidnappings in the Northern states were becoming more frequent. Several factors contributed to this increase.
First, although the laws enacted after 1807 banning the importation
of new slaves into the United States did not end American involvement in the slave trade, they did decrease the number of new persons kidnapped from Africa and brought into the United States.
Second, because the Jefferson Embargo and the War of 1812 interrupted the flow of immigrants from Europe to the United States, the
demand for other sources of labor increased throughout the whole

196

Nogee, supra note 191, at 191.
SWISHER, supra note 16, at 536.
Nogee, supra note 191, at 187.

197

See PA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REP. OF THE COMMr-rEE ON THE JUDICIARY

194
195

(March 7, 1850). See also MORRIS, supra note 5, at 33-34, quoting an 1817 account of the

interstate slave traffic in which the author reports that, while some of the people unlawfully sold into slavery had been kidnapped outright, others had been the victims of false
claims made under the 1793 Act:
They [slave traders] have lately invented a method of attaining their objects.., through the instrumentality of the laws;-Having selected a suitable free coloured person, to make a pitch upon, the conjuring kidnapper
employs a confederate, to ascertain the distinguishing marks of his body
and then claims and obtains him as a slave, before a magistrate, by
describing those marks, and proving the truth of the assertions, by his
well-instructed accomplice.
198

Nogee, supra note 191, at 186-87.
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country. Third, the newly established cotton plantations of the Old
Southwest added to the overall demand for slave labor.' 99
Faced with these developments, on March 27, 1820, Pennsylvania made its second legislative attempt to deal with the kidnapping problem by enacting "An Act to Prevent Kidnapping. ' 20 0 The
1820 Act increased the penalties for kidnapping to a maximum of
twenty-two years at hard labor. It also stripped aldermen and justices of the peace of the authority to enforce the federal Fugitive
20
Slave Act of 1793, reserving that authority to state judges.
Although the 1820 Act was meant to thwart kidnappers of free
blacks, it also had the additional, and perhaps unintended, effect of
making it difficult for slave catchers to remove persons who actually
were fugitive slaves. 20 2 This came about because, with aldermen
and justices of the peace no longer authorized to issue removal certificates, there simply were not enough officials to adjudicate the
large number of claims made under the Fugitive Slave Act.
Soon, Maryland complained that the 1820 Act was tantamount
to "an act of emancipation itself" and demanded that Pennsylvania
repeal the law. 203 Following extensive negotiations between the
Pennsylvania legislature and delegates from Maryland, the two
states resolved their dispute. This resolution required Pennsylvania
to enact a new statute entitled "An Act to give effect to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, relative to fugitives
from labor, for the protection of free people of color, and to prevent
kidnapping." 20 4 This 1826 enactment preserved the 1820 Act's
prohibitions on and penalties for the kidnapping of free blacks, and
also contained new provisions to regulate the capture and removal
5
of putative runaways. 2 0
More specifically, the 1826 Act widened the categories ofjurists
qualified to adjudicate slave claims, but also codified safeguards for
persons seized. It authorized the claimant to apply to any judge,
justice of the peace, or alderman for a warrant to arrest an alleged
199

GARY B. NASH ET AL., FREEDOM BY DEGREES: EMANCIPATION IN PENNSYLVANIA AND

ITS AFTERMATH 197 (1991).
200
Nogee, supra note 191,

at 191.
The 1793 Act gave federal judges authority to enforce the Act's provisions. Act
of 1793, 1 Stat. 302 § 3 (1793).
201

202
203

Nogee, supra note 191, at 191-92. See also NASH, supra note 199, at 200.

205

MORRIS, supra note 5, at 51-52.

Nogee, supra note 191, at 192. The tensions between Maryland and Pennsylvania, which Maryland slaveholders saw as involving the aiding and abetting of runaways by Pennsylvania citizens, and which many Pennsylvanians viewed as involving the
right of their state to protect its free black citizens from kidnapping, were ongoing and
neither began nor ended with the controversy surrounding the enactment of the 1820
anti-kidnapping statute. See Leslie, supra note 178, at 213-220 for an account of the
history of the relations between the two states.
204 Finkelman, supra note 15, at 7.
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fugitive.2 0 6 The warrant directed the sheriff of the relevant city or
county to arrest the person named in the warrant and bring him or
her before a judge of that jurisdiction. 20 7 Further, the Act specifically repealed that part of Pennsylvania's 1780 Gradual Emancipation statute 2 08 that authorized self-help in the seizure of an alleged
fugitive. Another provision of the 1826 Act prohibited officials from
issuing warrants solely on the application of an agent of the claimant, unless the agent both swore by oath or affirmation that the person named was the slave of the claimant and produced the
claimant's affidavit. 20 9 In the affidavit, the putative owner had to affirm title to the alleged fugitive, describe him or her, and supply his
or her age and name. 210 Further, the affidavit had to be certified by
an official authorized to administer oaths in the claimant's state. 2 11
After seizure of an alleged fugitive, the judge before whom the
person was brought was to issue the certificate of removal if satisfied
of the validity of the claim. 21 2 Neither the testimony of the owner
nor that of any other interested party could be received in evidence
to substantiate the claim. 21 3 In addition, the Act required the judge
to give the seized person time to obtain evidence challenging the
claimant's allegations. 21 4 A seized person who opted to take advantage of this opportunity was required to give security for his or her
appearance. If, however, the person could afford no security, the
judge could commit the person to jail instead, at the expense of the
claimant, with a hearing to be held after a "reasonable and just period" to determine whether the certificate of removal should be issued. 21 5 If the claimant wished a continuance of the hearing, then
the claimant had to give bond to secure his or her own appearance
16
at the final hearing. 2
Id.
Id.
208
For information on Pennsylvania's 1780 Gradual Emancipation statute see HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 147, at 299-305.
206
207

209

MORRIS, supra note 5, at 51-52.

210

Id.

211

Id.

Id.
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
As Leslie argues, the various accounts of the history of the 1826 Act are a "maze
of contradictions." Leslie, supra note 192, at 211 n.1. Leslie's own view of the history is
suggested by his statement that the 1826 Act "was a precursor to later interference by
northern states with... the national administration of laws for the protection of property in fugitive slaves," id. at 211, by what he calls "antislavery extremists." I& at 226.
For a more balanced historical analysis, see MORRIS, supra note 5, 1 at 42-53, and Nogee,
supra note 191, at 190-92, on whom I have primarily relied.
212

213
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Thus, unlike the 1793 federal fugitive slave law, Pennsylvania's
1826 Act contained evidentiary barriers to the success of a claim
lodged by the putative owner and provided some measure of procedural protection for the alleged runaway. It was this 1826 Act that
Edward Prigg violated when he failed to obtain the necessary certificate before removing Margaret Morgan and her children from
Pennsylvania.
Prior to her abduction by Prigg, Margaret Morgan had lived in
virtual freedom all of her life. 2 17 She and her parents had been
owned by a man named Ashmore, who allowed them to live on a
comer of his Maryland estate in practical-though not legal-freedom for a number of years. 2 18 Margaret married Jerry Morgan, a
free black man from Pennsylvania, and ultimately moved with him to
Lower Chanceford Township, York County, Pennsylvania. The
Morgans had a number of children, perhaps as many as six. Some
were born before the family left Maryland, but at least one was born
more than a year after the move to Pennsylvania. The Morgan family lived in York County for five years unmolested by Ashmore, but
in 1837, with Ashmore now dead, his niece and heiress, Margaret
Ashmore, hired four prominent Maryland citizens-Nathan S.
Bemis, Jacob Forward, Stephen Lewis, and Edward Prigg-to bring
Margaret Morgan back to Maryland and into bondage.
Pursuant to the 1826 Act, Prigg and his three fellow slave catchers obtained from Thomas Henderson, a York County justice of the
peace, a warrant to arrest Margaret Morgan as a fugitive slave. With
warrant in hand, Prigg arrested Mrs. Morgan and brought her back
to Henderson for a certificate of removal. For unexplained reasons,
'21 9
Henderson "refused to take further cognizance of the case."
Subsequently, Prigg and his cohorts, apparently unable to find a
judge to issue the certificate of removal, abducted Mrs. Morgan and
217 Account taken primarily from The Great Slavery Case, N.Y. TRiB., Mar. 14, 1842, at
1. See also Nogee, supra note 191, at 185; SWISHER, supra note 16, at 537-38.
218 None of the accounts of the Pnigg case explain why Ashmore allowed Margaret
Morgan's parents to live in virtual freedom. Maryland, like the other slave-holding
states, discouraged the outright emancipation of slaves by their owners by requiring that
certain conditions were met before the slave could be freed. See PAUL FINELMAN, THE
LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE: A CASEBOOK 95-189 (1986). Maryland's manumission
statute allowed masters to free their slaves only if the persons to be emancipated pos-

sessed "healthy constitutions," and were "sound in mind and body," could "gain a sufficient livelihood," and were no more than forty-five years old. GEORGE M. STROUD, A
SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA 151-52 (1827). In addition, the manumission could not occur if it
would result in the "prejudice of creditors." Id. at 152. Perhaps Ashmore was unable to
meet one of these conditions for emancipating Margaret Morgan and her parents.
219 Finkelman, supra note 15, at 8 (contending that Prigg was unable to meet the
requirements of the law). The Supreme Court's report of the case does not say why
Henderson refused to deal further with the matter.
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her children one night while her husband was away and forcibly
took them over the Pennsylvania state line into Maryland.
Little is known about what happened to Margaret Morgan and
her children after they were kidnapped. Some accounts say that the
kidnappers took them to Harford County, Maryland-some seven or
eight miles from the Morgan's Pennsylvania home-and that after
three days of investigation the county court certified that they were
slaves. 22 0 Other accounts report that Mrs. Morgan was given over
to Margaret Ashmore, who retained her in slavery. 2 21 And one
newspaper of the period reports that, after arriving in Maryland,
Mrs. Morgan and her children were sold to a slave driver to be taken
further South.222 In any event, what does seem certain is that a
woman who had lived her entire life in near-freedom became a slave
and saw her children also taken into bondage, and that her husband,
Jerry Morgan, lost his entire family to slavery.
In due course, Bemis, Forward, Lewis, and Prigg were indicted
in a Pennsylvania state court. 2 23 Subsequently, Governor Ritner of
Pennsylvania demanded that Maryland return them for trial. Rather
than comply with Governor Ritner's demand, Maryland's Governor
Veazey sent Thomas Culbreth, secretary of the Maryland Council,
to Harrisburg to negotiate, with the hope of getting the prosecutions dropped. 224 The mission proved unsuccessful, however, as
Pennsylvania refused to make any concessions. Governor Veazey
then agreed to the extradition. 2 25 The matter became more complicated, however, when the Maryland legislature, in December 1837
enacted a resolution calling for the appointment of a commission to
go to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, with three objectives in mind: secure the dismissal of the pending prosecutions; make whatever
agreements might be necessary to ensure that all issues between the
two states would eventually be decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States; and obtain "such modification of the Laws of Pennsupra note 16, at 537 (citing Delicate and Interesting Case, 56 NimEs'

220

SWISHER,

REG.
221
222

298 (1838)).

NAT'L

Johnson, supra note 182, at 166.
THE LIBERATOR, March 31, 1837, at 2, col. 5. Aside from the obvious tragedy of
being enslaved at all, life might have been even worse for the Morgans if they were in
fact sold further south, for the conditions of a slave's life on the large sugar and cotton
plantations of the Deep South were often much harsher than conditions in the Upper
Southern states of Maryland, Virginia and Delaware. See KENNETH STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INsTrruTION,

ch. 2 (1956). For example, slave laborers on sugar plantations were

driven to "the point of complete exhaustion," normally working sixteen to seventeen
hours a day, seven days a week during harvest time. Id. at 85.
223
SWISHER, supra note 16, at 538.
224 Id. at 538.
225

Id.
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sylvania as will preserve the rights of slave holders and cherish good
2 26
will between the two states."
As a result of this second set of negotiations, Maryland and
Pennsylvania agreed to work together to ensure United States
Supreme Court review. Their agreement called for the Pennsylvania legislature to pass a law that would require that a jury try
one of the kidnappers, Edward Prigg, by special verdict. Prigg and
the State of Pennsylvania would then stipulate to a statement of facts
to be presented to the jury, and the special verdict would be returned solely on the basis of the stipulated facts. If Prigg lost at
trial, he would have the right to appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court; if he lost there, he would have six months to appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, and no action would be taken to carry
2 27
out his sentence until after the Court's decision.
On May 22, 1839, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted a statute
embodying the agreement. The statute's express purpose was to
ensure that "all questions touching the constitutionality" of Pennsylvania's 1826 statute would be aired before and eventually decided by the United States Supreme Court. 2 28 Within less than a
year of the agreement between the two states, Prigg was found
guilty by special verdict of kidnapping Margaret Morgan, his conviction was upheld pro-forma by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and
the case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 2 29
2. Story's Opinion
According to Story's "opinion of the Court, '2 30 the issue in
23
Prigg was the "constitutionality of the statute of Pennsylvania." 1
226 Id. at 538 & n. 25 (quoting message of Governor Thomas W. Veazey to the Maryland legislature, January 2, 1839, at 19).
227
FINKELMAN, supra note 15, at 8.
228
Id.
229
Id. For unexplained reasons, the special verdict made no mention of whether the
kidnapping of the Morgan children was also unlawful. As early as 1816, Pennsylvania
courts had ruled that a child conceived and born in Pennsylvania was free even though
the child's mother was a runaway slave. PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND CoMrrY 65 (1981). At an earlier point in the course of this controversy, the Maryland legislature claimed that one of the issues in the case was "[t]he right
of a master to the produce of his fugitive slave, born of her in a non-slaveholding state."
MORRIS, supra note 5, at 94 n.3 (quoting NILES' REGISTER, May 25, 1839). None of the
accounts of the background of Prigg show why Pennsylvania and Maryland dropped this
question from the case.
230
Pfigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 608.
231
Id. at 609. As historians have noted, Story did not command a majority of the
Court on most of the propositions advanced in his opinion. See, e.g., Joseph C. Burke,
What Did the Prigg Decision Really Decide?, 93 PA. MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 73 (1969).
However, the official reporter states that Story delivered the opinion of the Court, and
several of the Justices who wrote separately referred to Story's opinion as the opinion of
the Court or as the majority's opinion.
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The ambiguities of the federal Fugitive Slave Clause, coupled with
Pennsylvania's argument that its 1826 statute was a sincere effort to
comply with both its constitutional duty to return fugitive slaves and
its obligations to its free black citizens, should have allowed an able
judge to decide in favor of the Pennsylvania law. It is virtually inconceivable that a jurist as exceptionally able as Story genuinely
thought the clause required him to rule in favor of slavery. For example, Story reasonably might have compared the terms of the Fugitive Slave Clause to the provisions of the 1826 Act and held that
2 32
the Act was in harmony with the literal language of the clause.
Because the Act did not free any slaves and provided a mechanism
for sending a fugitive back to the state from which he or she had
fled, Story could have held that the Pennsylvania law did not violate
Article IV.233 Alternatively, Story could have found that the federal
scheme for effecting the reclamation and removal of an alleged fugitive articulated in the 1793 Act had many gaps that the states were
23 4
free to fill.
Although a decision upholding the 1826 Act would have indirectly affirmed the legality of slavery, it would have had two important virtues from an antislavery perspective. First, it would have
preserved the procedural protections that Pennsylvania and other
Northern states had devised to protect free blacks from fraudulent
claims made under the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act. Second, it also
would have acknowledged state power to enact laws giving proce23 5
dural protection to actual fugitives.
232
Indeed, Dworkin suggests that, had the judges in Cover's study remained true to
the traditional formal style ofjudging (which he defines as a mechanistic, legalistic style
ofjudging that was popular among English jurists) they would have looked to the literal
language of the Fugitive Slave Clause and concluded that it was the federal 1793 Act that
was unconstitutional. See Dworkin, supra note 20. Thus, in a sense, Dworkin argues that
these judges suffered from too little formalism rather than, as Cover contends, too
much. Id
233
CURRIE, supra note 16, at 242-43 makes this point.
234
Of course, this resolution of the question would still have contained the germ of
moral contradiction, as it would have required Story to recognize the legality of slavery
in the United States-after all, there could be no valid law, state or federal, regulating
the return of fugitive slaves if slavery was itself unlawful. Some of the more radical abolitionists argued that slavery was unconstitutional despite the Fugitive Slave Clause and
the other constitutional provisions recognizing the existence of slavery. See WILLIAM M.
WIECER, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONsTrrTTIoNALIsM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at
253-75 (1977) for a discussion of the arguments of the "radical constitutionalists." Prigg
did not present any issue that would have allowed a judge to strike a direct blow at the
legality of the institution of slavery. Thus, a decision which made more difficult the
enforcement of those laws that enabled slavery to exist was probably the most the Court
could have done in Prigg. But see Sanford Levinson, ConstitutionalRhetoric and the Ninth
Amendment, 64 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 131, 152 (1988) (arguing that Story could have used
the Ninth Amendment to hold that slavery was unconstitutional).
235
Of course, if the person really was a fugitive slave owned by the claimant, these
protections, in some cases might ultimately have done the person no good. But, at least,
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Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that Story sincerely
believed that the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution gave him
no choice but to reach a decision favoring slavery, he was not compelled to strike down the Act if he truly found slavery morally repugnant. Rather, in keeping with the advice of many abolitionists,
including his former pupil Wendell Phillips, he could have resigned.2 3 6 Alternatively, he could have engaged in a conscious act
of civil disobedience and refused to interpret the constitutional provision in the way that he believed was morally reprehensible,
2 37
although legally correct.
a.

What Story Decided

Justice Story chose neither to resign nor to defy the law. Nor
did he attempt to justify a resolution favorable to the forces of freedom. Instead, he struck down the 1826 Act. He held that it was
unconstitutional because "[ilt purports to punish as a public offence
against that state, the very act of seizing and removing a slave by his
master, which the Constitution of the United States was designed to
justify and uphold." 23 8 In attempting to support this holding, Story
articulated principles and conclusions that went far beyond what
was necessary to justify invalidating the law. In doing so, he rendered an extremely proslavery opinion; one which effectively
stripped the states of all constitutional authority to regulate the reclamation of fugitives and left little room for legislation to protect
free blacks.
In setting forth his reasoning, Story began by stating that the
Fugitive Slave Clause conferred upon the slave owner "a positive,
unqualified right" to possession and ownership of the slave that "no
state law or regulation can in any way qualify, regulate, control, or
restrain." 2 39 According to Story, "any state law or state regulation,
which interrupts, limits, delays, or postpones the right of the owner
to the immediate possession of the slave" effectively operated as a
discharge of the slave.2 40 Since the Pennsylvania law necessarily re24
sulted in delay, it was unconstitutional. '
the existence of those protections might have discouraged many owners from trying to
reclaim fugitives, and undoubtedly would have given many runaway persons more time
in freedom.
236 NEWMYER, supra note 23, at 378.
237 Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of
ProfessorSchmidt, 86 CoLuM. L. REV. 1622, 1655-56 (1986) (observing that while judicial
civil disobedience raises the specter of "complete dissolution of the legal order, [some]
regimes ... do not warrant continued existence.").
238 Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 626.
239
Id. at 612.
240
241

Id.

Id. at 625-26.
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Next, Story maintained that, not only did the clause confer
upon the owner the right of recapture without necessity of resort to
legal process, 24 2 it also conferred upon the federal government the
authority to enact legislation to enforce the right. This was so, Story
asserted, for two reasons: as a practical matter, the master would
often be unable to recapture the fugitive without the assistance of
public officials; and, since the right of recapture is conferred by the
national Constitution, the "natural inference" is that authority to
enact legislation enforcing the owner's right must be vested in the
243
national government as well.
Story then turned to the question of whether the federal government had exclusive power to legislate with regard to the return
of fugitive slaves. He concluded that federal power was exclusive,
because if states could legislate in this area chaos would reign, with
each state presumably enforcing the rights of slaveholders according to its own views and interests. The resulting disuniformity with
regard to the nature and enforcement of the right would be intolera24 4
ble in light of the importance of the right at stake.
Finally, Story held that Pennsylvania's law was preempted because it conflicted with the 1793 Act. Story made no attempt to
point out specific conflicts between the federal and state statutes. 24 5
Instead, he found Pennsylvania's law preempted because the federal
legislation "points out fully all the modes of attaining those objects,
which Congress, in their discretion, have as yet deemed expedient
Id. at 613.
[W]e have not the slightest hesitation in holding, that, under and in virtue
of the Constitution, the owner of a slave is clothed with entire authority,
in every state in the Union, to seize and recapture his slave, whenever he
can do it without any breach of the peace, or any illegal violence. In this
sense, and to this extent this clause of the Constitution may properly be
said to execute itself; and to require no aid from legislation, state or
nation."
Id at 615.
243
Id. at 615. Story also attempted to find support for federal legislative authority
in Article III. Given that the clause uses the term "claim," he argued, it obviously contemplates a judicial proceeding for giving effect to the owner's right. Moreover, the
controversy surrounding the claim was a case arising under the Constitution and, therefore, was within the express delegation of judicial power to the national government
given by Article III. That being so, Story argued, Congress could implement the judicial
power to give effect to the right by prescribing "the mode and extent in which it shall be
applied, and how, and under what circumstances the proceedings shall afford a complete
protection and guaranty to the right." Id. at 616. Interestingly, in the 1833 edition of
his COMMENTARIES, which was published before Prigg, Story called recoveries under the
Fugitive Slave Clause "summary ministerial proceedings, and not the ordinary course of
judicial investigations." See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 677
(DaCapo Press 1970) (1833).
244 Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 623-24.
245
CURRIE, supra note 16, at 243-44.
242
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or proper to meet the exigencies of the Constitution." 246 Hence,
even if there were gaps in the federal scheme, the states had no authority to enact legislation to "complement" the federal law, for
"the legislation of Congress, in what it does prescribe, manifestly
indicates that it does not intend that there shall be any farther [sic]
'24 7
legislation to act upon the subject-matter.
b.

Critique of the Decision

Story's opinion is an exhaustive explication of the nature and
means of enforcement of a slaveholder's right to the return of a runaway. At the same time, the opinion inexplicably fails to give any
consideration to Pennsylvania's competing right-indeed, its dutyto protect its free black citizens from kidnapping. Because slavery
was based primarily on color, all blacks, whether free or enslaved,
were in danger of being claimed as runaways by slave catchers. Obviously, then, it was nearly impossible for the states to protect their
free black citizens, unless they could regulate slave catchers with regard to reclamation of actual fugitives. Pennsylvania's counsel
strenuously argued this point.2 48 Yet Story completely ignored the
argument, never addressed Pennsylvania's right and duty to protect
its free black citizens, and never mentioned the possibility that one
of Mrs. Morgan's children, born in Pennsylvania, might have been
free under the laws of that state2 49 and thus have been made a slave
unlawfully. Story's failure to address the inevitable effect of his decision on free blacks calls into question the validity of his reasoning
in striking down the Pennsylvania statute, but it is hardly the only
basis for questioning his reasoning. David Currie, among others,
points out that upon close examination Story's reasoning does not
25 0
stand up well.
247

Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 617.
Id. at 618.

248

See id. at 573 where Hambly argues: "under this clause a power is contained, in

246

virtue of which, any one may step into a crowd and seize and carry off an alleged slave,
'just as he would a stray horse,' or any other article of personal property."
249 FINKELMAN, supra note 178, at 47. Indeed, under Pennsylvania's Gradual Abolition Act of 1780, Margaret Morgan and her other children may have been free as well.
The 1780 Act contained a provision that granted instant freedom to any slave kept in
Pennsylvania for longer than six months. This provision was an act of comity on Pennsylvania's part to slaveholding visitors or travelers from other states. Such visitors and
travelers were allowed to bring their slaves with them into Pennsylvania, but if the slave
remained for longer than six months, he or she was automatically deemed free under the
law. Id. at 46-69. Although the six-month rule did not apply to fugitives, Mrs. Morgan
and her children were arguably not fugitives, as Ashmore had allowed them to remain in
Pennsylvania for five years. Thus, under the six-months rule, they were free. It is not
known why Pennsylvania did not press such an argument in Pigg. Perhaps the explanation is that Pennsylvania wanted the issue of the constitutionality of its kidnapping statute definitively decided by the Supreme Court.
250 See CURRIE, supra note 16, at 242.
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First, Story's entire decision is based upon a dubious characterization of the purpose of the Fugitive Slave Clause: "to secure to the
citizens of the slaveholding states the complete right and title of
ownership in their slaves, as property, in every state in the Union
into which they might escape from the state where they were held in
servitude." 2 51 Thus, in Story's view, the Fugitive Slave Clause was
designed to make the slave states' laws on the right of reclamation
of fugitives operative throughout the entire nation, effectively nullifying the laws of free states. 25 2 To support this characterization of
the purpose of the clause, Story relied on a then-popular belief. that
the guarantee of the return of fugitive slaves was so vital to the
South that the Union could not have been formed without it.253 In
fact, said Story, the clause was so important to the southern states
that it was "adopted into the Constitution by the unanimous consent of the framers of it; a proof at once of its intrinsic and practical
254
necessity."
Story's characterization of the clause is not supported by historical evidence. Indeed, there is scant evidence in the historical record as to what the Framers intended to accomplish with the Fugitive
Slave Clause. The clause is not mentioned in the FederalistPapers.2 55
The references to the clause in James Madison's Notes of Debates in the
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 611.
Near the outset of the opinion Story sets forth the following rule for construing
the Constitution:
[P]erhaps, the safest rule of interpretation after all will be found to be to
look to the nature and objects of the particular powers, duties, and rights,
with all the lights and aids of contemporary history; and to give to the
words of each just such operation and force, consistent with their legitimate meaning, as may fairly secure and attain the ends proposed.
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 610-11. Interestingly, this rule of interpretation was absent
from his first edition of Story's COMMENTARIES but was added to the second edition,
published after the Prigg decision. See 2JOHN C. HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 461 n.1 (1862).
253 Story argued that:
The full recognition of this right and title was indispensable to the security of this species of property in all the slaveholding states; and, indeed,
was so vital to the preservation of their domestic interests and institutions, that it cannot be doubted that it constituted a fundamental article,
without the adoption of which the Union could not have been formed.
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 611. This "historical necessity" argument apparently was first
made by ChiefJustice William Tilghman of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in an 1819
case, Wright v. Deacon, 5 Serg. & Rawle 61 (Pa. 1819). MORRIS, supra note 5, at 42.
"Our southern brethren," he declared, "would not have consented to become parties to
a constitution ... unless their property in slaves had been secured." Id. Because, in
Tilghman's view, the Fugitive Slave Clause contemplated a summary proceeding for the
return of fugitives, he held that the delay of a trial to adjudicate a slave catcher's claim
would be contrary to the Constitution. Id.
254 Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 612.
255 See generally, THE FEDERALIST (especially Nos. 42, 54 and 55, the three papers
discussing slavery, none of which even mentions the Fugitive Slave Clause).
251
252
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Federal Convention show that, unlike the other clauses related to slavery, the Fugitive Slave Clause was the source of little debate. 25 6 According to Farrand's records of the Convention, the clause was
discussed at the Convention on only one occasion: when Pierce Butler and Charles Pinckney of South Carolina moved to "require fugitive slaves and servants to be delivered up like criminals. ' 25 7 The
motion triggered objections on the Convention floor by Roger
Sherman of Connecticut andJames Wilson of Pennsylvania. Wilson
said that such a provision would wrongly require a state's executive
to aid the slave catcher at public expense, while Sherman argued
that there was "no more propriety in the public seizing and surrendering a slave or servant, than a horse." Butler then withdrew his
proposal "in order that some particular provision might be made
apart from this article." 258 The next day, Butler proposed a new
provision for the return of fugitive slaves. 25 9 His proposed provision was accepted without discussion or objection. With no material
changes in wording, it became the clause as it was ultimately
26 0
adopted.
Story's claim that the Fugitive Slave Clause was vital to the formation of the Union not only lacks supporting evidence, but is, as
Don Fehrenbacher notes, actually belied by the fact that the First
Congress in 1789 did not pass any legislation to implement the
clause. 2 6 ' In 1789 the First Congress was engaged in a vigorous,
wide-ranging effort to enact laws fundamental to the new federal
government. One might have expected that a provision of the Constitution so "vital" to the South, one without which the Union could
not have been formed, would have been implemented by federal
legislation at the first available opportunity. Not until 1793, however, did Congress enact any legislation on the return of fugitive
slaves, and then only at President Washington's behest.
Story's contention that Pennsylvania's proceeding for determining the validity of a claim amounts to a "discharge" within the
meaning of Article IV also fails on close examination. This conclusion is far from a natural reading of the language of Article IV. The
256

NOTES

OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787

REPORTED BY JAMES

Norton & Co. 1987) (1893). Madison's Notes were available to Story,
and they were cited by Thomas C. Hambly, Pennsylvania's counsel in Prigg, in his arguMADISON (W.W.

ment to the Court. According to the reporter of the Prigg case, Hambly cited Madison's
Notes for the proposition that the matter of the recovery of fugitive slaves "was expected to be left to state legislation; and that the south was not united itself upon the
subject." Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 587.
257

EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE CONsTrrurION OF THE UNITED STATES 415 (1964).

258
259
260

Id. at 416.
ROBINSON, supra note 31, at 229 (quoting Farrand's records).
Id.

261

FEHRENBACHER,

supra note 30, at 40.
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terms Story used-"interrupt,....
limit," "delay" and "postpone"cannot be sensibly collapsed into the word "discharged" without
262
draining these words of their separate and established meanings.
What is more, as even Story admitted in his opinion, the language of
the clause contemplates some kind of proceeding to adjudicate the
validity of a purported owner's "claim" before the alleged fugitive is
to be "delivered up."' 263 This is exactly what Pennsylvania's law
required.
In addition, Story's argument proves too much. If the clause
really created an unqualified right to the return of the fugitive without even the delay required to determine the validity of the claim,
then Story was obliged to strike down not only the Pennsylvania law
but the Federal Fugitive Slave Act as well. Like the Pennsylvania
law, the Federal Act required the claimant to comply with certain
2
procedures in order for the alleged fugitive to be reclaimed. 64
Story's view that the Fugitive Slave Clause confers legislative
power on the national government is also suspect. Story went out of
his way to express this view, since he had already held that the Pennsylvania statute was unconstitutional because it effected an impermissible discharge of the slave from labor. His interpretation here
is at odds with the structure of the Constitution. The clause is contained in Article IV, which sets forth the rights and duties of the
states relative to one another. Article IV is generally not concerned
with the powers of the national government, which are the subject
of Articles I through III. The fact that Article IV, in the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, 26 5 specifically gives the national government au262
As one commentator has observed, "[b]ut this is an impossible diction, in which
the distinctions between 'interrupt,' 'limit,' 'delay,' 'postpone,' and 'discharge' are all
erased." James Boyd White, Constructing a Constitution: "Original Intention" in the Slave
Cases, 47 MD. L. REv. 239, 248 (1987). Cf Mark V. Tushnet, Translation As Argument, 32

WM. & MARY L. REV. 105, 116 (1990) (book review) (criticizing White's analysis and

arguing that in ordinary discourse some people might "occasionally want to distinguish
among [these terms]," but
[a]sJohn Marshall understood... the language of the Constitution was a
language of condensation which used general terms to express authority
to deal with subjects that, in a more refined form of discourse, people
treat separately. Story might well have thought that the fugitive slave
clause was exactly of this nature.).
My own view is that White has the better of this argument. However "unrefined" the
language of the Constitution may be, Story's collapse of these terms robs them of any
distinction the different words convey.
263
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 615.
264
As Thomas Hambly pointed out to the Court, if the Pennsylvania law was unconstitutional because it caused a delay in the owner's enjoyment of his or her right to
possession of the slave, so too should the federal law be unconstitutional. Id. at 582.
Taney also makes this argument in his separate opinion. Id. at 626-33 (Taney, C.J.,
concurring).
265 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.

1132

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1086

thority to enact legislation to aid the states in fulfilling their obligations to each other does not undermine this point. Rather, it
suggests that when prescribing powers for the national government
outside the confines of Articles I through III, the Framers were careful to make clear what they were doing. By implication, if the Framers intended to confer upon the national government the power to
enact legislation to aid the states in fulfilling their duties to return
fugitive slaves, it is fair to assume that they would have explicitly
said so in the Fugitive Slave Clause.
Story attempted to buttress his view of implicit congressional
power with two arguments. He argued first that the Constitution
and the 1793 Act were "nearly contemporaneous[]" (and thus the
legislators were probably familiar with what the Framers intended
by the clause). This argument is unpersuasive. In making the argument, Story did not rely on the formal legislative history of the Fugitive Slave Clause. He could not, for that history sheds little light on
either the Framers' intent or on what the participants in the state
ratifying conventions understood to be the purposes and effects of
the clause. Instead, Story's argument rests on the assumption that
the members of the First Congress, being intimately familiar with
the views of the Framers, would not have enacted legislation they
believed to be outside the scope of Congress' constitutional authority. But, as Justice Brennan observed when addressing the same argument about the Establishment Clause, this assumption is
questionable. Members of the First Congress, like any other legislators, "influenced by the passions and exigencies of the moment, the
pressure of constituents and colleagues, and the press of business
...[may not have] always pass[ed] sober constitutional judgment on
every piece of legislation they enact[ed]. ' 2 6 6
Story's second supporting argument was that long-term state
acquiescence to an exercise of federal power reflects a general understanding implicit in the Constitution. 267 But if long-term acquiescence is the test, then Story was obliged to uphold not only the
Federal Act but the Pennsylvania law as well. After all, the federal
government had also long acquiesced to the view held by state legislators that the states possessed the authority to enact legislation to
implement the Fugitive Slave Clause and to pass legislation to aid in
the enforcement of the 1793 Act.
This last point raises a more general question: even if Congress
had authority under the Fugitive Slave Clause to pass legislation to
enforce the right of the owner to the return of the fugitive, why does
it follow that this power existed exclusively in Congress? No prece266
267

Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 814 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
PTigg,

41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 620-21.
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dent required a finding that the mere existence of a power in the
federal government deprived the states of all authority over the
same subject matter. 268 And, as Justice Daniel noted in his concurring opinion, the Court had previously held that the bankruptcy
2 69
power, one explicitly vested in Congress, was not exclusive.
Why, then, should a power that was merely implied be deemed exclusive? As David Currie has pointed out, Story neither addressed
Daniels' argument nor explained why it would not have been sufficient for Congress simply to have enacted legislation preventing the
states from making laws that unduly interfered with the return of
2 70
fugitives.
Story's holding of federal preemption is also open to question.
First, preemption analysis was completely unnecessary once Story
said that the power to legislate belonged exclusively to Congress.
More importantly, the conflict between the 1793 Act and the Pennsylvania law was not as obvious as Story claimed. Both the federal
and the state legislation required a proceeding in which some official could pass, at least preliminarily, on the validity of a claim
before the alleged fugitive could be removed from the state.
Admittedly, Pennsylvania's statute imposed certain requirements that the Fugitive Slave Act did not, including a higher burden
of proof on the claimant, as well as particular methods of proof. But
the 1793 Act arguably left it to the adjudicating official to decide the
methods and standard of proof. This argument would emphasize
that the Federal Act authorized the issuance of the removal certificate only upon "proof to the satisfaction" of the presiding official
that the person seized was actually the slave of the claimant. 2 7 '
Moreover, as Thomas Morris points out, under the Judiciary Act of
1789, the laws of the several states were to be the rules of decision
in federal courts; thus a federal judge in a free state could, if he
chose, bring the 1793 Act into harmony with state law by allowing
proof in the form accepted by state courts. 272
In sum, Story's failure even to mention the problem of the kidnapping of free black citizens, the various respects in which he went
out of his way to write an expansive, strongly proslavery opinion,
and the relative ease with which he might have justified upholding
the Pennsylvania law despite the Fugitive Slave Clause and imple268
Indeed, in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425 (1819), Chief
Justice Marshall established the principle that the mere grant of a power to the federal
government by the Constitution does not deprive the states of the right to exercise a
similar power.
269
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 653-54 (Daniel, J., concurring).
270 This argument is made more fully in CURRIE, supra note 16, at 244 nn.50 and 52.
271
Act of Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302 (1793).
272
MORRIS, supra note 5, at 21.
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menting statute, all make it difficult to credit the contention that
Story agonized over choosing between fidelity to his conscience and
fidelity to his duty under the law. Rather, as discussed below, Story
may have had his mind on very different concerns when he wrote the
Prigg opinion.
III
NATIONALISM, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND FUGITIVE SLAVES

A.

The Expansion of Federal Power

Among the jurists of his time, Story was perhaps the most vocal
and active advocate of expanding federal power at the expense of
the states. 2 73 Guiding his judicial philosophy was a vision of the future suffused with the belief that, if America was to become a great
nation, it had to take advantage of its abundant resources and broad
opportunities for the expansion of trade and commerce. In Story's
view, a strong national government, rather than a mere confederation of states, was the obvious way to do this. Story's most explicit
articulation of this belief came in an 1815 letter he wrote to his
friend, Congressman Nathaniel Williams. In the letter he extolled
the virtues of a strong central government:
Let us extend the national authority over the whole extent of
power given by the Constitution. Let us have great military and
naval schools; an adequate regular army . . . [and] a permanent
navy; a national bank; a national system of bankruptcy; a great
navigation act; a general survey of our ports, and appointments of
port wardens and pilots; Judicial courts which shall embrace the
whole constitutional powers; national notaries; public and national justices of the peace, for the commercial and national concerns of the United States. By such enlarged and liberal
institutions, the Government of the United States will be endeared to the people, and the factions of the Great States will be
rendered harmless. Let us prevent the possibility of a division, by
creating great national interests which shall bind us in an indissol2 74
uble chain.
Story's nationalistic vision is also reflected in his judicial opinions. On the bench, he was a longtime champion of expansive national power. Some of his opinions evidencing this commitment are
recognized as quite important to the evolution of constitutional law,

273
274

Commager, supra note 24, at 33-35.
The letter is quoted in MCCLELLAN, supra note 78, at 252-53.
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but others have fallen into relative obscurity, apparently overshad27 5
owed by the contributions of John Marshall.
For example, in his dissenting opinion in Brown v. United
States, 2 76 a case decided five years before Chief Justice Marshall ar2 77
ticulated his implied powers doctrine in McCulloch v. Maryland,
Story proved himself an early advocate of broad implied powers. In
his Houston v. Moore278 dissent, Story advanced expansive views of
federal preemption and exclusive federaljurisdiction. In New York v.
Miln,2 79 again writing in dissent, he passionately called for an interpretation of the Commerce Clause that would substantially enlarge
28 0
federal lawmaking powers at the expense of state police powers.
And in his two most famous opinions for the Court, Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee 28 1 and Swift v. Tyson, 28 2 he confirmed sweeping notions of federal judicial power. 28 3
The nationalistic doctrines set forth in these opinions were also
reflected in Story's opinion in Prigg. For example, his conclusion
that the 1793 Act was within Congress' constitutional authority was
grounded in the expansive notion of implied powers that he expressed in Brown and elsewhere. By the same token, in holding that
the federal government had exclusive, rather than concurrent, jurisdiction over the interstate recovery of fugitive slaves, Story exhibited a mistrust of state legislatures and state courts that is also
evident in his nationalistic opinions. In his view, the states could
have no role in the interstate reclamation of runaways because, if
they did, each state would be "at liberty to prescribe just such regulations as suit its own policy, local convenience, and local feelings."' 28 4 As a result, the owner's right to return of the fugitive
"would have no unity of purpose, or uniformity of operation." 28 5
275
See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 16, at 194-95 (arguing that Marshall dominated the
work of his Court to the point that the other Justices were "nearly invisible" and that
Story was a "minor figure.").
276
12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814). See also Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19
(1827). See Commager, supra note 24, at 40.
277
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See Commager, supra note 24, at 40.
278
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
279
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
280
See also United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72 (1838) (where Story found
authority in the Commerce Clause for Congress to make it a federal crime to steal goods
from a ship wrecked or stranded); Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257
(1873) (Story, J., dissenting).
281
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
282 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
283
For an argument that there were seeds of Swift in some of Story's earlier circuit
court cases, see Commager, supra note 24, at 49. As several scholars have pointed out,
Story was far more solicitous of federal judicial power than of legislative or executive
power. See, e.g., id. at 41; MCCLELLAN, supra note 78, at 263.
284 Pigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 623.
285 Id at 624.
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His language and reasoning here were reminiscent of his opinion in
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. There, arguing that the need for national
uniformity required that federal courts be the final arbiters of the
meaning of federal law, Story maintained: "[S]tate attachments,
state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes obstruct, or control . . . the regular administration of
28 6
justice."
Story was not merely being consistent in his nationalism when
deciding Prigg. In Prigg, he actually carried his nationalistic views
further than in his other opinions. 28 7 In one of the most misunderstood passages in the Prigg opinion, Story suggested that Congress
had no authority to require state officials to exercise the authority to
dispose of fugitive slave rendition claims given to them in the 1793
Act. Indeed, Story said, it "might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise of the power of interpretation, to insist that the states
are bound to provide means to carry into effect the duties of the
national government." 28 8 Moreover, Story went on to suggest that
state legislatures could, if they chose, forbid their judicial officials
from enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.289
This dictum has caused confusion partly because many Northern state legislatures seized upon it as justification for enacting legislation forbidding their magistrates and judges from taking
cognizance of cases arising under the 1793 Act. 2 90 Even in the absence of legislation, Northern state judges used this dictum as an
286 Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 348-49. See also Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1; Houston
v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820). McClellan makes the point that this same distrust
of state courts is seen in the Swift decision. See MCCLELLAN, supra note 78, at 261.
287
The only other contender might be dictum in Houston v. Moore, where Story argued that the states had no authority to enact laws as a "sort of process in aid" of the
federal government's exercise of its constitutional authority to make criminal law. Houston, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 68.
288
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 616.
289
Id. at 622. As Story stated: "while a difference of opinion has existed ... on the
point.., whether state magistrates are bound to act under it; none is entertained by this
Court that state magistrates may, if they chose, exercise that authority, unless prohibited
by state legislation." Id. Note that these statements were inconsistent with Story's own
view of the supremacy clause and that the Supreme Court later ruled that states did have
an obligation to enforce federal law.
290
As discussed earlier in this Article, see supra text accompanying notes 204-11, the
1826 Act at issue in Prigg,like its 1820 precursor, contained a provision prohibiting the
state's quasi-judicial officials from administering the 1793 Act. After Prigg,the antislavery forces in Pennsylvania and other states extended this prohibition to judicial officials
as well. Finkelman, supra note 15, at 21-22. But long before Prigg, antislavery forces
argued that Congress had no authority to empower state officials to administer federal
fugitive slave laws. Ironically, they based their argument on Story's holding in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee that the Constitution expressly required that the judicial power of the
United States be vested in federal courts. That being so, the abolitionists argued, Congress could not invest state judicial officials with authority to issue removal certificates
under the 1793 Act. Leslie, supra note 192, at 214.
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excuse for refusing to hear rendition cases. 29 1 Because there were
so few federal judges, these post-Prigg state statutes, along with the
refusal of state judges to take cognizance of reclamation claims,
made the 1793 Act much more difficult to enforce. 29 2 Justice Story's
son argued that this was exactly the effect his father intended, and
his attempt to salvage his father's reputation in face of the proslavery Prigg decision has helped give rise to the confusion surrounding Story's dictum. 2 93 But it is doubtful Justice Story had any such
subversion of the law in mind, for he was one of the chief architects
of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, a law far more draconian and effective than the 1793 Act in aiding slave catchers.
Evidence of Story's participation in drafting the 1850 Act is
contained in a letter that he wrote on April 29, 1842 to John McPherson Berrien, then Chairman of the SenateJudiciary Committee.
The letter primarily concerned proposed legislation dealing with
the bankruptcy and criminal jurisdictions of the federal government
on which Story and Berrien had been collaborating. In the letter,
Story also addressed the problem of enforcement of the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act. He first noted that state magistrates could not be
compelled to aid in the return of fugitive slaves even though the
1793 Act authorized them to do so. The Prigg case, Story argued,
showed how state magistrates either evaded the duty imposed by the
Act or refused to exercise the power given them "to act in delivering
up Slaves." ' 29 4 Story then suggested as a solution to the problem of
state recalcitrance that Congress adopt a provision giving Federal
Commissioners the same power to enforce the 1793 Act that the Act
already conferred on state officials. Story explained his idea as
follows:
In conversing with several of my Brethren on the Supreme Court,
we all thought that it would be a great improvement, & would
tend much to facilitate the recapture of Slaves, if Commissioners
of the Circuit Court were clothed with like -powers....
The
Courts would appoint commissioners in every county, & thus
meet the practical difficulty now presented by the refusal of State
Magistrates.... [These commissioners could be given the authority to] exercise all the powers, that any State judge, Magistrate, or
Justice of the Peace may exercise under any other Law or Laws of
the United States .... 295
Finkelman, supra note 15, at 22.
Id. at 35.
See COVER, supra note 16, at 241.
The letter is quoted in McCLELLAN, supra note 78, at 262 n.94.
MCCLELLAN, supra note 78, at 262-63 n.94. McClellan found this letter among
theJohn McPherson Berrien Papers of the Southern Historical Collection at the University of North Carolina. As McClellan reports, while this letter is reprinted in 2 THE LIFE
291
292
293
294
295
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Moreover, Story contended, if the provision could be worded generally, it might be enacted "without creating the slightest sensation in
Congress" and indeed could "pass without observation." 29 6 After
asking the Senator's pardon for taking the liberty of making these
suggestions, Story explained that he had done so because of a "de29 7
sire to further a true administration of public Justice."
This letter is of interest not because it shows that Story's son
was either wrong or intentionally deceptive about his father's motives. More importantly, it makes plain that what mattered to Story
was not the freedom of enslaved blacks but the expansion of national power. There is nothing in Story's scheme that even hints at
acknowledging the need to restore any of the due process rights that
alleged fugitives were certain to lose if state law were wiped out in
favor of the 1793 Act-an act with no procedural protections for
alleged runaways. Perhaps, as some have argued, Story was chiefly
concerned with finding a workable solution to the controversy between North and South and averting a possible break-up of the
Union. 298 But even if this was so, the fact remains that the solution
that he urged required sacrificing the right of black people to their
freedom.
B.

Reverence for the Rights of Property

Nationalism was very likely not the only value driving Story's
decision in Prigg, for that case also involved another value of prime
importance to him-the sanctity of property rights. Early in the
opinion, Story made it clear that what was at stake in the case for
slaveholders were their property rights. Explaining his version of
the history of the Fugitive Slave Clause, Story asserted that the object of the Fugitive Slave Clause was to secure to slaveholders "the
complete right and title of ownership in their slaves, as property"
and that "[t]he full recognition of this right and title was indispensable to the security of this species of property in all slaveholding
states." 29 9 Further, in discussing the national character of this right,
he argued that throughout the whole of the Union, the clause guaranteed to the slaveholder all of the rights to the slave's labor "which
the local laws of his own state confer upon him as property." 30 0 Because the right of recapture was one such right conferred by the
AND LETrERS OF JOSEPH STORY 404-05 (William W. Story ed., 1851), Story's son omitted

the part having to do with the Fugitive Slave Act.
296
Id. at 262.
297
Id. at 263.
298
See, e.g., NEWMYER, supra note 23, at 352.
299 Prigg,41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 611.
300

Id. at 613.
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laws of the slaveholding states, the slaveholder was vested with the
30 1
right to this "property" in non-slaveholding states as well.
Story's reverence for the rights of property owners may be less
well-known than his nationalism. But the fact that he was a champion of property rights should hardly be surprising. He was a member of the propertied and commercial classes of New England, and
had served their interest for most of his legal career prior to his
ascension to the Supreme Court. Thus, as a young lawyer he developed close professionil ties to the wealthy Crowninshield family of
Salem, 30 2 and, upon being elected to the Massachusetts legislature,
lobbied successfully on the family's behalf for legislation chartering
the Merchants' Bank of Salem. 30 3 Soon after the Bank received its
charter, Story was appointed as one of its directors and later became
the Bank's President. 30 4 As a member of Congress, he solicited
votes on legislation favorable to New England land speculators, and
acted as their counsel in the great "Yazoo" land fraud case that
30 5
culminated in the Supreme Court's decision in Fletcher v. Peck.
Even after taking his seat as a Justice of the Supreme Court, he continued to associate with the commercial and manufacturing leaders
30 6
of New England.
But Story had more than a material connection to the interests
of the owners of property. Although he lived most of his adult life
in the nineteenth century, he was primarily a product of the eighteenth, the century in which he was born and came of age, and in
which the theories of republicanism prevailed. 30 7 Story subscribed
to the republican belief that "property was the foundation of the
social order, basic to republican citizenship and inseparably connected with liberty." 308 For Story and other republicans government's primary purpose was to secure to its citizens the "natural
right" to acquire property and to hold that property unfettered by
government interference with the enjoyment of its use. This belief
was reflected throughout Story's life, in his speeches, writings, and
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Id.
See

303

MYERS,

301

supra note 23, at 47-51.
supra note 128, at 267.
304
Id. at 268.
305 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). As co-counsel, Story represented these same interests before the Supreme Court in Fletcher. NEWMYER, supra note 23, at 66.
306
NEWMYER, supra note 23, at 165.
307
NEWMYER, supra note 23, passim (especially xiii-xvii). Republicanism has taken
various forms throughout American history, and the literature on it is extensive. See the
sources listed in Alfred S. Konefsky, Law and Culture in Antebellum Boston, 40 STAN. L. REV.
1119, 1134 n.75 (1988). See also Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American
Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 273 (1991).
308
NEWMYER, supra note 23, at 169.
NEWMYER,
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judicial opinions.30 9 Two speeches from the 1820s are particularly
illustrative of his views in this regard. One is a speech Story gave at
the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1820-21. Having
taken leave from his Rhode Island circuit court duties, Story was in
nearly constant attendance during the two months of the convention. One of the items on the convention's agenda was considera-

tion of a proposal to revise the state's constitution so as to provide
for more popular control over the state legislature. The majority of
delegates favored a proposal changing the basis of apportionment
in the state senate from what one delegate termed the "aristocratical
[sic] principle" of property representation to representation based
on population by districts.3 1 0 Story was a member of the committee
assigned to resolve the senate representational issue.

In their presentations to the committee, many of the proponents of the population-based proposal stressed the natural antagonisms between the rich and the poor and the failure of the

3 11
propertied class to represent adequately the interests of the poor.
In a long and impassioned address to the committee, Story objected
to this dichotomizing between the interests of the rich and those of
the poor. 31 2 The dichotomy was "an odious" one, Story argued, for
in Massachusetts there was no "class of very rich men ... whose
wealth is fenced in by hereditary titles." Rather, there existed a
"harmony of interests" between the rich and the poor, a harmony
derived from their common desire for the security of property.3 1 3

"When I look round," Story said, "and consider the blessings which
property bestows, I cannot persuade myself, that gentlemen are serious in their views that it does not deserve our utmost protection,"
See MCCLELLAN, supra note 78, at 194-237 on Story's defense of property rights.
G. Edward White's explanation of the eighteenth-century republican belief that
civic virtue stemmed from the holding of property perhaps gives some insight into
Story's views:
[Tihe possession of property was an index of one's worth to society.
Those possessed of freeholds were felt to be, because of their disinterestedness, worthy participants in civic affairs. Their economic independence made them less susceptible to demagoguery or corruption; their
wealth gave them the leisure to concentrate on virtuous pursuits. The
association of a propertied status with civic-mindedness can be seen in
the suffrage requirements of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: the model voter in the early American republic was an owner of a
freehold, and unpropertied persons had difficulty convincing others that
they could be trusted to participate in civic affairs.
WHITE, supra note 75, at 598.
310
MCCLELLAN, supra note 78, at 228 (quoting Republican Henry Dearborn's speech
before the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention (1820-1821)).
311
Id. at 228.
309

312
See Joseph Story, Speech on the Apportionment of Senators, Before the Convention of Massachusetts Assembled to Amend the Constitution (November 1820), reprinted in THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 180 (William W. Story ed., 1852).
313
Id at 182.
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as property is "the sour[c]e of all the comforts and advantages we
enjoy."3 1 4 Moreover, he said, property rights were just as important, if not more so, than liberty itself. What "is life worth," Story
asked, "if a man cannot eat in security the bread earned by his own
industry? [I]f he is not permitted to transmit to his children the lit3 15
de inheritance which his affection has destined for their use?"
Furthermore, it was the ownership of property by some in the society, he argued, that allowed them to lift up those less fortunate. 3 16
A second speech illustrative of Story's strong views on property
rights is his inaugural address as Dane Professor of Law at Harvard
University given in 1829. One passage of this speech, in particular,
captures Story's life-long republican reverence for the rights of
property:
The sacred rights of property are to be guarded at every point. I
call them sacred, because, if they are unprotected, all other rights
become worthless or visionary. What is personal liberty, if it does
not draw after it the right to enjoy the fruits of our own industry?
What is political liberty, if it imparts only perpetual poverty to us
and all our posterity? What is the privilege of a vote, if the majority of the hour may sweep away the earnings of our whole lives, to
gratify the rapacity of the indolent, the cunning, or the profligate,
who are borne into power upon the tide of a temporary
3 17
popularity?
Story's Supreme Court opinions also provide abundant evidence that he was an ardent defender of property rights. Only two
opinions-Terrett v. Taylor 31 8 and Wilkinson v. Leland 3 1 9-need be ex-

315

Id. at 182-83.
hL at 184.

316

Id.

314

STORY, supra note 81, at 519. The most important surviving evidence that Story
remained a lifelong champion of property rights comes from Story's 1836 article "Natural Law," which is reprinted in MCCLELLAN, supra note 78, at 313-24. In this long and
philosophical discourse, Story discusses a wide range of topics, from the duties human
beings owe to God, to the institution of marriage, which Story calls an "institution derived from the law of nature," and the origins of political society. Id. at 316. But Story
reserves the longest part of his essay to an exploration of the institution of property.
"One of the great objects of political society," he said, "is the protection of property."
Id. at 319. Interestingly, as this essay also shows, for Story the sacred rights of property
were not confined to traditional forms, such as land and chattels, but included "property
in actions" as well. That is, contracts were also a specie of property, which in "modem
times constitute the bulk of the fortunes and acquisitions of many persons." Story
viewed the obligation to perform these contracts as "indispensable to the social intercourse of mankind" and as "conformable to the will of God." Id. at 321.
318
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
319
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 (1829). For other opinions in which Story championed the
protection of property rights see Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 420 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823);
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (Story, J., concurring).
317
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amined, however, to illustrate the point, for they contain, perhaps,
the most unequivocal judicial assertions of his belief in the sanctity
of property rights.
Terrett, Story's first opinion for the Court on a constitutional issue, grew out of the following facts. In 1770, the Episcopal church
of Arlington, Virginia purchased from Daniel Jennings certain land
located in Fairfax County, Virginia.3 20 In 1776, after the Revolution, the Virginia legislature passed a statute that "confirmed and
established" the church's title to the Jennings land.3 2 1 In 1784, the
legislature enacted a further law that made the church a "corporation.., to have, hold, use and enjoy" all church property.3 22 Later,
in 1786, it repealed the church's corporate charter, but made sure
that the church's right to its property was preserved and confirmed.
In 1798, however, the Virginia legislature repealed both the 1776
and the 1784 statutes "as inconsistent with the principles of the constitution and of religious freedom."3 2 3 Finally, in 1801, after the
Jennings land had become part of the District of Columbia, the legislature enacted another statute asserting the legislature's right to
all church property. The 1801 statute also directed that the
church's land be sold, with the proceeds to be used for the welfare
of the poor members of the church's parishes.3 24 Members of the
church then brought suit to enjoin the sale.
On these facts, the Court's decision that the church, and not the
state of Virginia, owned the Jennings land should have been relatively simple. The 1786 statute repealing the prior confirming legislation merely left the church where it had been before all of this
legislative activity: as owner of the land purchased fromJennings in
1770. Moreover, the 1801 statute was a nullity. At the time it was
enacted, Virginia had no authority to enact laws with respect to that
land, since, as part of the District of Columbia, the land was within
the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of Congress, as prescribed by
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.
Story's opinion suggests that the Court based its decision, at
least in part, on similar reasoning.3 25 But, in a confusing passage,
Story appears to reason much more broadly:
[T]hat the legislature can repeal statutes creating private corporations, or confirming to them property already acquired under the
For a thorough examination of Story's judicial defense of property rights see MCCLELLAN, supra note 78, at 194-226; see also Commager,
320
Terrett, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 43.
321
Id. at 47.
323

Id.
Id. at 48.

324

Id.

325

CURRIE,

322

supra note 16, at 138.

supra note 24, at 64-73.
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faith of previous laws, and by such repeal can vest the property of

such corporations exclusively in the state, or dispose of the same
...as they may please... we are not prepared to admit; and we
think ourselves standing upon the principles of natural justice,
upon the fundamental laws of every free government, upon the
spirit and the letter of the constitution of the United States, and
upon the decisions of most respectable judicial tribunals, in re3 26
sisting such a doctrine.

It is not apparent whether Story intended this passage as dictum, as
the holding of the Court, or as an alternative holding.3 2 7 If Story
intended either of the latter possibilities, one would have expected
him to cite either the relevant constitutional provisions or the decisions of the "respectable judicial tribunals" on which he relied.
That he did nothing of the sort has led David Currie to observe that
Story went far beyond the grounds necessary to decide the case. According to Currie, Story addressed novel constitutional issues in a
vague and conclusory manner and ignored relevant precedent to set
aside state laws contrary to Story's personal views of "natural justice." 3 28 Currie seems to suggest that these shortcomings in Story's
opinion were primarily the result of bad writing. I think, though,
that they largely reflect Story's outrage over what was to him a
grossly unjust invasion of property rights by the Virginia
3 29
legislature.
326 Terrett, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 52. G. Edward White points out that the legal basis
of Story's decision is unclear. The language of the opinion, White argues, suggests that
the Court invalidated the 1801 statute because it was an example of the legislature "dispos[ing] of vested property ... as [it] may please," and so "was contrary to 'natural
justice,' the 'fundamental laws of every free government,' and the Constitution's 'spirit
and letter.'" WHrE, supra note 75, at 609 (quoting Terrelt, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 52). As
to the constitutional part of this assertion, White argues that neither the Takings Clause
nor the Contracts Clause seemed to apply. Id. at 609. Moreover, White argues that
Story did not rely on Article I, Section 8's provision giving to Congress all power to
make laws for the District of Columbia. Yet, as White further notes, Story, as well as
other commentators, have taken the view that the Court based its decision on the Contracts Clause. Id. at 610.
327
See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 16, at 139 (expressing the view that Story's reliance
on natural justice was, at most, an alternative holding). But see WHrrE, supra note 75, at
609 (suggesting that the natural justice argument was Story's holding in the case). Lawrence Tribe also points to Story's reliance on natural justice as the basis upon which
Story struck down the statute. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrIUTIONAL LAW
562 (1988).

328

CURRIE,

supra note 16, at 141.

In a discussion of Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420
(1837), Story showed just how darkly he viewed governmental interference with property rights. The majority opinion, from which Story vigorously dissented, confirmed a
Massachusetts statute that chartered the Warren Bridge as a free bridge, thereby wiping
out the value of the Charles River bridge, which had received an earlier charter from the
legislature. Writing about the Court's decision, Story wailed that "[a] case of grosser
injustice, or more oppressive legislation, never existed. I feel humiliated, as I think
329
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In terms of gratuitous property rights polemics, Story's opinion
in Wilkinson v. Leland3 3 0 may even outdo his opinion in Terrett. In
Wilkinson, Jonathan Jenckes, a resident of New Hampshire, bequeathed to his infant daughter Cynthia certain land located in
Rhode Island. BecauseJenckes was insolvent at his death, his executrix obtained a license from the New Hampshire probate court to
sell enough of his estate's real property to satisfy the debts. Pursuant to this license, the executrix sold the Rhode Island property in
1791. The purchasers were unsure, however, whether the executrix
had the authority to make the sale, so she agreed to obtain a statute
ratifying and confirming the title from the Rhode Island legislature.
In 1792, the legislature passed such a statute. But years later, the
heirs of CynthiaJenckes sued to void the Sale on the ground that the
1792 statute was beyond the authority of the legislature. They
maintained that the statute wrongly divested CynthiaJenckes of her
331
vested rights in the property.
Writing for the Court in Wilkinson, Justice Story held that the
1792 statute did not divest Cynthia of her property rights because
this had already been done by operation of the testamentary laws of
Rhode Island. 33 2 Before stating this holding, however, Story
launched into an unnecessary discourse on the question of whether
the Rhode Island charter (which Rhode Island had received from
Charles II while still a colony and which, despite the Revolution,
continued to serve as Rhode Island's fundamental law) 333 conferred
upon the legislature the authority to "transfer the property of A. to
B. without his [A's] consent. ' 334 Of course, in Wilkinson there had
been no such transfer of A's property. Rather, the legislature had
merely confirmed the validity of a transaction between two private
parties. Nevertheless, Story railed against the mere possibility that a
legislature could make a transfer of A's property to B without A's
consent. That such authority could exist in any American government after the Revolution was unimaginable, Story said:
[G]overnment can scarcely be deemed to be free, where the rights
of property are left solely dependent upon the will of a legislative
every one here is, by the Act [of the state legislature] which has now been confirmed [by
the Court]." 2 LIFE AND LE-rERS OF JOSEPH STORY, supra note 28, at 268.
330
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 (1829).
331 Id. at 656.
332
Id. at 658-60. Story reasoned that the property rights CynthiaJenckes acquired
were encumbered by the debts of the estate; the laws of Rhode Island required that the
estate be charged with those debts; those laws further allowed the discharge to be made
by the sale of so much of the estate's real estate as necessary to satisfy the creditors; and,
once such a sale occurred, the devisee was divested of her rights in the property by
operation of law.
333
Id. at 656.
334
Id, at 658.
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body, without any restraint. The fundamental maxims of a free
government seem to require, that the rights of personal liberty
and private property should be held sacred .... [T]he power to
violate and disregard [such rights] ...[is] a power... repugnant

to the common principles ofjustice and civil liberty.

....
.33

But what does all this have to do with Prigg? After all, Story's
ardent defense of property rights does not show that he personally
viewed either Margaret Morgan or any other slave as property. Arguably, Story's references in Prigg to slaves as property simply recognize the fact that some states had by law created a right in some of
their citizens to own other human beings as property. Moreover,
the only express indication in all of Story's voluminous writings as
to whether he personally regarded slaves as property or as human
beings suggests the latter: in his 1819 Grand Jury Charge he called
black people "brothers," and argued that they too have a right to
liberty.
On the other hand, the Grand Jury Charge may be much less
probative than it appears, in light of Story's political goals with respect to the Missouri Compromise, so it is difficult to distinguish
between his true feelings and mere peroration. More broadly, given
that Story wrote so prolifically,3 3 6 and given the vigor with which he
involved himself in the effort to enlarge federal court jurisdiction
and the scope of federal law, 3 37 it seems strange that he agitated so
33 8
little on behalf of slaves in particular and black people in general.
Indeed, in view of Story's enthusiastic extra-judicial activities in defense of national power and property rights, it may be fair to say
with regard to his relative silence on the rights of blacks that "the
failure of a dog to bark can be every bit as meaningful as the most
' 3 39
anguished howl.
According to Derrick Bell, nothing in Story's record "forecloses
the possibility" that he shared the view prevalent at the time that
black people were subhuman and inferior to whites.3 4 0 I am willing
to go somewhat further and suggest that his record intimates that he
Id,at 657.
The volume and range of Story's writings were so great that it is perhaps a gross
understatement to call Story's writings prolific. For more on Story as a publicist see
NEWMYER, supra note 23, at 271-304.
337
See Commager, supra note 24, at 51 (detailing these activities).
338
Indeed, in a case decided early in his career on the bench, Story showed his lack
of concern for the freedom of black people by joining with the majority of the Court in
applying wooden evidentiary rules against a black family claiming freedom. See Mima
Queen & Child v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290 (1813).
339
Here I borrow Sanford Levinson's use of Sherlock Holmes's observation. See
Sanford V. Levinson, Fidelity to Law and the Assessment of PoliticalActivity (Or, Can a War
Criminalbe a Great Man?), 27 STAN. L. REV. 1185, 1186 n.4 (1975).
340
Bell, supra note 28, at 357.
335
336
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in fact shared this view. In making this suggestion, I rely, in part, on
the striking lack of attention in his writings and public statements to
the rights of blacks, but I rely even more so on his treatment in Prigg
of Margaret Morgan and her children, the human beings whose passions, dreams, and deepest fears were poised so tenuously at the
center of the conflict being played out between Pennsylvania and
Maryland. As previously noted, he only referred to them in the
opinion as property. Not a word is spoken about their humanity or
about the tragedy of their having forever lost their liberty after
3 41
spending the whole of their lives in virtual freedom.
Furthermore, Story ignored completely the status of the child
born in Pennsylvania, under whose laws the child was entitled to
freedom. Admittedly, the case did not present the Court with an
opportunity to render a binding judgment as to the child's status.
The parties having apparently contrived to eliminate that aspect of
the case from the Court's review, nothing that Story had to say on
the matter could have restored the child's freedom. But whether or
not the child should have been regarded as free was quite relevant
to the case: Pennsylvania's counsel argued vigorously that the state's
1826 Act protected its free black residents from kidnapping while
fulfilling its constitutional obligation to return those lawfully
claimed as slaves. Story could have used the child's tragic storyborn a free person, yet because of the color of her skin, unlawfully
kidnapped into a life of slavery-as an illustration of the need of the
states to enact laws protecting free blacks from kidnapping. 3 42 But
Story chose to ignore this tragedy. He had a different agenda, one
that subordinated the claims of black people to human dignity to the
claims of slaveholders to their property.

341

As James Boyd White notes, perhaps the recognition of the humanity of Mrs.

Morgan and her children would not have led to a different result in the case, but it might
have resulted in "substantial difficulties, emotional and intellectual" with the Court's
decision-difficulties that at least may have "tended to erode ... that part of [the law]
which maintained slavery." White, supra note 262, at 270.
342

James Boyd White argues:
To focus.., upon the circumstances of Mrs. Morgan's freeborn child in a
way that recognized that the child was a person, entitled to freedom but
needing his or her family, would have been to realize that Mrs. Morgan
and indeed her unfree children were people too; a realization, which, if
articulated with sufficient clarity, would have tended to erode, not the
discourse of law, which it would have exemplified, but that part of it
which maintained slavery.
Id. at 270.
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IV
CONCLUSION:

SHOULD JUSTICE

STORY BE JUDGED?

In this Article I have attempted to demonstrate that the scholarly effort to reconcile Justice Story's antislavery reputation with his
strongly proslavery opinion in Prigg is misguided. In my view,
Story's antislavery reputation has been exaggerated. Thus, the proslavery position he took in Prigg may not have caused him the moral
agony that some scholars have ascribed to him.
Story's antislavery reputation rests on a thin foundation: one
circuit court opinion in a slave trade case, his 1819 Grand Jury
Charge, and his opposition to the expansion of slavery into the territories. But my examination of Story's opinions in slave trade cases
presents a picture of a judge who merely consistently applied the
same legal rules to slave trade cases that he applied to other cases,
regardless of whether the results of doing so aided or thwarted the
government's efforts to enforce the antislave trade laws. The 1819
Grand Jury Charge, in which he passionately spoke out against slavery and the slave trade, was given during a time of heated debate in
America over the expansion of slavery into the territories. I have
tried to show that Story's opposition to this expansion had as much
to do with his fear that the expansion of slavery would increase the
political power of the South, at the expense of New England, as it
did with any qualms he had about the immorality of slavery.
I have further argued that protection of property rights and expansion of federal power were very high in Story's hierarchy of values. Story wrote extensively in defense of both property rights and
nationalism. He also used his political connections to push his nationalist agenda. In contrast, Story was relatively silent on the question of slavery and the status of blacks in either the North or the
South. In my view, Story's own emphasis suggests that both property rights and nationalism took precedence over the plight of slaves
and free blacks. Thus, when Prigg confronted Story with a choice
between the expansion of federal power and the protection of property rights, on the one hand, and recognition of a state's duty to
protect free blacks from kidnapping as well as an opportunity to undermine the system of slavery, on the other hand, it is not surprising
that Story chose nationalism and property rights over the interests
of black people.
The attempt of scholars to "explain away" Prigg while accepting
Story's antislavery reputation at face value raises a question that
goes beyond an historical assessment of what Story did in Prigg. In
my view, the attempts to explain Prigg seem to be tinged with apology for the decision rather than clothed with the condemnation the
opinion deserves for the immorality of what Story decided. I must
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admit that it is tempting
to view Story merely in terms of his own
"mental universe" 343 and from this perspective, not condemn him
for his decision in Prigg. One cannot help but be impressed by
Story's talent and his contributions to the development of the law
and the legal profession. Further, in light of so many nineteenth
century judges' indifference to, if not active support for, the institution of slavery, one almost cannot help but be captivated by Story's
1819 Grand Jury Charge and his stirring rhetoric in LaJeune Eugenie.
Indeed, it is difficult not to admire him for feeling a need to defend
his role in upholding an unjust law. Certainly this need was not felt
by many of his contemporaries, such as Roger Taney, who gave us
Dred Scott, or Samuel Nelson, whose "judicial laxness" as the Justice
with circuit duties for the Second Circuit "made the port of New
3 44
York a haven for slave traders."
Moreover, why should we condemn Justice Story if nationalism
and property rights-matters close to his own self-interests-were
more important to him than freedom and equality for blacks? After
all, he was no different in this regard than Northern state legislatures that abolished slavery not so much out of humanitarian concerns, but rather out of fear of slave insurrections and concern over
the competition between slave and free labor in an economic climate that depended upon free labor for growth.3 45 Many abolitionists, too, were motivated by self-interest. Fear of retribution in the
Hereafter moved them as much as concern for the rights of blacks to
liberty and equality. It is tempting, then, to say Story's stance on
slavery was no worse, indeed a good bit better, than many of these
others, and leave it at that.
Indeed, some might argue that the very enterprise of trying to
assess the morality ofJustice Story's position in Priggis illegitimate.
Under this view, our primary task instead ought to be to come to an
"understanding [of] the past in its own terms. ' ' 34 6 Fortunate to live
in a more enlightened age, we should not presume to pass moral
judgment on one, such as Story, who had the misfortune to live in a
benighted time when the prevailing values and norms deemed slavery legitimate and gave to it the protection of law. 34 7 In keeping
with one of "the old-fashioned rules of historiography," we should
343
344

Tushnet, supra note 54, at 114.
NEWMYER,

supra note 23, at 349.

For a comprehensive treatment of the abolition of slavery in the North see LEON
F. LITWACH, NORTH OF SLAVERY (1961). See also ARTHUR ZILVERSmrr, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH 46-52 (1967).
345

346 A.E. Keir Nash, Reason of Slavery: UnderstandingtheJudicialRole in the PeculiarInstitution, 32 VAND. L. REV. 7, 217 (1979).
347 Nash, supra note 199, at 218. But see Sanford Levinson, supra note 234, at 153-54
(arguing that even in Story's times slavery was immoral and Story knew it).
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judge the past by past standards not present ones.3 48 Even Cover,
who set out to try to come to some judgment about the peace his
"antislavery" judges made between their perceived duty to the law
and their duty to their own conscience, apparently felt obliged to
pay substantial deference to this time-honored rule: he was unwilling to say clearly whether he believed that these judges should be
condemned for upholding laws they knew were unjust or exonerated because they were caught in a moral-formal trap not of their
3 49
own making.
Nonetheless, while I do not completely agree with Oscar
Wilde's assertion that our only duty to history is to rewrite it, I think
we who live in the present do have a responsibility, not only to reexamine the past, but also to make moral judgments about that
past.3 50 Indeed, when assessing the history of law and legal institutions, especially as regards oppressive laws, there are at least two
reasons why we have a particular responsibility to try to come to
terms with the morality of decisions made by judges. First, because
the law builds upon its past and looks to that past to legitimize the
present. Without moral judgments about the traditional resolutions
of legal problems, we are apt to rely unquestioningly upon those
past resolutions, even though their underlying values and norms are
wrong and oppressive. 3 5 1
Second, the predominant values that shape both our legal institutions and the decisions made by judges are often constructed
without the participation of those who are victimized by those decisions and institutions. Listening to the past only in the voices of
those sounding the prevailing theme deprives us of the vital opportunity to learn from the experiences of the oppressed in our quest to
understand and learn from our history.
How then should we judge Justice Story for his Prigg decision?
To me, the answer is straightforward. Story was a member of the
348
See also NEWMYER, supra note 23, at xiii. Writing of his involvement with Story's
life while researching his biography, Newmyer observed: "What I discovered as I struggled to understand him ... was the wisdom of the old-fashioned rules of historiography:
the need for historians to get out of their own skin, to avoid anachronism, to judge by
past, not present, standards." Id349 Bell, supra note 28, at 356.
350
As Meier and Rudwick note, African-American scholars face a dilemma when
writing about the history of race relations in America: on the one hand they must avoid,
inJohn Hope Franklin's phrase, "the temptation to pollute... scholarship with polemics," while on the other hand refuting "the mispresentations propagated by so many
white historians .... " AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOTr RUDwICK, BLACK HISTORY AND THE
HISTORICAL PROFESSION, 1915-1980, at 277 (1986).
351
For a striking example of the use of the morality of the past as the basis for
judicial resolution of a question of individual rights in the present see ChiefJustice Burger's concurring opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (Burger, CJ.,
concurring).
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ruling elite at a time when one of the cornerstones of American society was the perpetual enslavement of kidnapped Africans and their
descendants. As a member of that elite, Story, like most nineteenth
century jurists, upheld the laws that allowed slavery to exist. Story
had a choice, and the choice he made was to participate in the perpetuation of slavery. In so doing, he made himself a part of what
Cover once called the federal judiciary's "long tradition as executors of immoral law." 3 52 No assessment of Story would be complete
without taking into account that fact, and his moral failure relegates
him to less than the place of honor he has heretofore assumed in the
history of American law. Instead, he joins the ranks of those other
jurists, past and present, who have participated in the shame of
3 53
oppression.
Silence on the morality ofjudicial participation in fostering the
slavery system "inculcates tolerance for a vicious and all too familiar
trait: complacency in the face of injustice." 3 54 It is the now-dead
black victims who suffered under that system who we dishonor by
our silence on the immorality of what happened to them. Fear of
3 5 5 of
that dishonor, rather than fear of demeaning the reputation
352
Robert M. Cover, Atrocious Judges: Lives of Judges Infamous as Tools of Tyrants and
Instruments of Oppression (1856), 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1968) (reviewing book of
the same name by Richard Hildreth). A useful comparison can be made between the
actions of American judges confronted with laws upholding slavery and the reactions of
German judges who were called upon to enforce the laws of the Nazi regime. Apparently, only one judge, Dr. Lothar Kreyssig, refused to serve Hitler from the bench, while
"the overwhelming majority of [German judges] shared responsibility for the terror."
INGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 196 (1991).
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I leave myself open to the charge of engaging in "presentism"-a term historians
use to describe historical analysis which views the past through the lens of the present,
often with a political point of view. I do not mind pleading guilty to such a charge. The
presentist view allows historians to approach accepted conceptions and conventions
from a new perspective, bringing new insights and fresh energies to established historical "truths." As one historian of the "New Left" of the 1960s put it:
When a man is digging up facts to support traditional and accepted interpretations. . . he may, without too much difficulty, prevent himself from
becoming impassioned.... On the other hand when a scholar arrives at a
radical or unconventional interpretation, he may very well become excited by what he is doing. For the act of contradiction involves emotions
more tumultuous than those aroused by the state of acceptance. Scholarly dispassion is the true medium of the scholar satisfied with (or browbeaten by) things as they are.

The Radicalism of Disclosure, STUDIES ON THE LEFT 2 (Fall 1959), quoted in PETER NOVICK,
THAT NOBLE DREAM:

THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION"

AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL

PROFESSION 425 (1988). See also Alexander, supra note 307, at 279 & n.16 (defending
presentism). For a discussion of the "perils" of presentism, see Douglas L. Wilson,
Thomas Jefferson and the CharacterIssue, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, November 1992, at 57.
354 Kennedy, supra note 237, at 1631. Kennedy argues that the United States has
instances in its past that "pose problems for historical and moral analysis that are hauntingly similar" to the Holocaust, the Gulag, and Apartheid. Id. at 1631 n.37.
355 See Bell, supra note 28, at 357 (qualifying his remarks about Story by suggesting

he did not mean to dishonor him).
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"great"judges, should be our concern as we look back over our past
3 56
and try to draw from it lessons for our present and for our future.

356 This Article's conclusion is for George Moses Horton, a slave and a poet, who
published his poems to try to raise money to purchase his freedom and settle in Liberia.
Horton did not know freedom until the Civil War, when in 1865 he escaped to Union
lines. He died after only three years of freedom. Here is an excerpt from one of his
poems, On Liberty and Slavery:
Alas! and am I born for this,
To wear this slavish chain?
Deprived of all created bliss,
Through hardship, toil and pain!
How long have I in bondage lain,
And languished to be free!
Alas! and must I still complainDeprived of liberty.
Oh, Heaven! and is there no relief
This side the silent graveTo soothe the pain-to quell the grief
And anguish of a slave?
Come Liberty, thou cheerful sound,
Roll through my ravished ears!
Come, let my grief in joys be drowned,
And drive away my fears. ...
Bid Slavery hide her haggard face,
And barbarism fly:
I scorn to see the sad disgrace
In which enslaved I lie.
Dear Liberty! upon thy breast,
I languish to respire;
And like the Swan unto her nest,
I'd to thy smiles retire.
George Moses Horton, On Liberty and Slavery, reprinted in ROBERT STAROBIN, BLACKS IN
BONDAGE: LETrERS OF AMERICAN SLAVES 113-15 (1974).

